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Abstract
This paper examines whether ﬁnancial conditions of the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector can ex-
plain why the recovery from recessions in the United States is slower since the mid-1980s. Lever-
age by the corporate sector has increased signiﬁcantly since the ﬁnancial deregulation of the
mid-1980s. Empirical evidence shows that slow recoveries are associated with a signiﬁcant drop
in the growth rates of investment and bank loans, and with a surge in the growth rates of cor-
porate bonds. In an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a ﬁnancial
accelerator, counterfactual experiments based on estimates of two samples  1965-1983 and 1984-
2007  show that the non-ﬁnancial corporate indebtedness aﬀects only marginally the speed of
the recovery in the two samples.
Keywords: speed of recoveries, indebtedness, ﬁnancial frictions, estimated DSGE model.
JEL Codes: E32, E44
1 Introduction
In recent times there has been an increasing interest on the role of leverage and indebtedness in shap-
ing the business cycle. Leverage that builds up in `normal times' can generate adverse feedback loops
in `bad times', eventually leading to a prolonged credit crunch (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). Changes
in balance sheets of borrowers and lenders can substantially aﬀect the response of macroeconomic
variables to adverse shocks hitting the economy. Ng and Wright (2013) argue that the process of
deleveraging can aﬀect the recovery. In fact, in a highly leveraged economy the whole private sector
 ﬁnancial institutions, ﬁrms and households  attempt to deleverage when asset prices start to fall.
Since all agents increase saving at the same time the economy looses demand, thereby frustrating
any attempt to repair balance sheets. In a sample of 14 advanced countries between 1870 and 2008,
Jordà et al. (2013) ﬁnd evidence of a close relationship between credit-intensive expansions and the
intensity and the persistence of the subsequent recession.
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Recovery rates from recessions  computed as four and eight-quarter growth after trough  have
become signiﬁcantly slower since the mid-1980s in the US economy, as shown by Galí et al. (2012)
in the context of the debate jobless versus slow recoveries. At the same time, ﬁnancial deregulation
has led to an increase in leverage in many sectors of the US economy.
This paper investigates whether the build-up of leverage in the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector
could help explain the slow recoveries. The key intuition is that, because of the deleveraging process
in response to shocks, borrowers may postpone investment because they have to build up their
capital. The paper ﬁrst documents three sets of stylised facts in the US economy. First, following
Galí et al. (2012) it shows that in the post-WWII period the speed of recovery of economic activity
following recessions has signiﬁcantly slowed down since the mid-1980s. Diﬀerently from Galí et al.
(2012), the paper examines the growth rates of the GDP main components and it shows that these
slower recoveries are associated with a large and signiﬁcant drop in the growth rate of (in particular
non-residential) investment following a recession. The cumulated growth rate of non-residential
investment two years after the trough of the recession falls from more than 16% in the earlier period
to less than 2% after the mid-1980s. This drop in the growth rate of investment is also reﬂected in
a signiﬁcant drop of borrowing by the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector. While before the mid-1980s,
real debt of the corporate sector typically grew by more than 10 percent in the two years after the
trough of a recession, afterwards real debt remained below its level at the trough of the recession
for two years following the trough. Second, in the the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector the growth
rates of loans are signiﬁcantly slower since the mid-1980s, while the contrary happens for the growth
rates of corporate bonds. Third, following the ﬁnancial deregulation of the mid-1980s leverage of
the corporate sector, deﬁned as the ratio of total assets over net worth, has increased quite strongly.
Average leverage rose from 1.6 in the period from 1965Q1 to 1983Q4 to a level of more than 1.9 in
the period from 1984Q1 to 2007Q4. In other words, the debt to equity ratio of the corporate sector
rose by 50 percent. Data also show that while there was a signiﬁcant increase in business default
rates, the external ﬁnance premium has not risen that much during the Great Moderation.
The paper then uses an estimated New Keynesian (NK) model with a ﬁnancial accelerator à la
Bernanke et al. (1999) to examine whether the slow recoveries from the 1990s could be explained
by the diﬀerent ﬁnancial conditions of the corporate sector. The mechanism in the model works as
follows: changes in borrowers' balance sheets aﬀect investment decisions, and hence output. In the
phase of a recession, the private sector is reducing debt, asset prices fall while liabilities remain. The
business sector is forced to repair balance sheets by increasing savings or paying down debt. This act
of deleveraging reduces aggregate demand and lead the economy into a recession. To investigate the
extent to which changes in borrowers balance sheet aﬀect the recovery, in a ﬁrst step, we estimate
the NK model over two samples, 1965Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2007Q4, setting corporate leverage,
spreads and business failure rates to those values observed in the data.1 In a second step, similarly
to Galí et al. (2012), we conduct counterfactual experiments in order to examine whether ﬁnancial
1Other papers have estimated a similar model for the US/Euro Area economy with diﬀerent research questions
(see De Graeve, 2008; von Heideken, 2009; Gelain, 2010; Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2013; Christiano et al., 2014;
Fuentes-Albero, 2014; Villa, 2016, among others).
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factors might explain the diﬀerence in the speed of recoveries. Galí et al. (2012), instead, examine
ﬁrst the role of shocks  while keeping parameters unchanged  and then the role of all the structural
parameters in explaining the slower recoveries in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model à la Smets and Wouters (2007) also featuring unemployment. In a third step we analyse
the sensitivity of the impulse response functions (IRFs) to diﬀerent ﬁnancial conditions of the non-
ﬁnancial corporate sector. Our main ﬁnding is that ﬁnancial factors account only very partially for
the evidence of slow recoveries from the mid-1980s.
The closest study to ours is Fuentes-Albero (2014), who investigates whether a similar DSGE
model  estimated for the US economy with structural breaks in a subset of the parameter space  is
able to the capture the large volatility in ﬁnancial aggregates contemporary with the low volatility
in real and nominal variables during the Great Moderation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the stylised facts regarding
changes in the speed of recoveries and ﬁnancial conditions of the corporate business sector since
the mid-1980s. Section 3 brieﬂy sketches the NK model. Section 4 presents the counterfactual
exercises and impulse response function analysis. Finally, Section 5 brieﬂy concludes. The appendix
complements the paper by providing (a) basic evidence on the indebtedness of the household sector
and of all commercial banks in the US economy; (b) the derivation of the ﬁnancial contract, the
deterministic steady state and the full set of the DSGE model linearised equilibrium conditions;
(c) steady state eﬀects of changing the deep ﬁnancial parameters of the model; (d) details on the
construction of the dataset used in the estimation; and (e) a series of robustness checks for the
results.
2 A preliminary look at the data
This section analyses the speed of recovery following a recession of some macroeconomic variables
as well as developments in the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector in the US economy in the post-WWII
era.
Similarly to Galí et al. (2012), Figure 1 shows growth rates accumulated over four and eight
quarters following each postwar U.S. recession of real output, real personal consumption expendi-
tures, and real ﬁxed private investment.2 The ﬁgure conﬁrms that the speed of recovery of GDP
has slowed down from the 1990s. A similar slowdown can be seen in the cumulated growth rates of
investment and consumption, although growth rates of investment show a more pronounced pattern,
mainly due to its higher volatility compared to consumption. Table 1 reports the average growth
rates after NBER recessions of GDP and its main components in the pre-90 sample, which considers
8 recessions, and in the 3 recessions of the post-90 sample. It is evident that the average speed of
recoveries of these variables is statistically diﬀerent across the two samples.
Figure 2 disentangles the growth rate of total investment into its two components, residential
and non-residential ﬁxed investment. Although growth rates of residential investment are generally
2Appendix A reports all data sources and transformations. Data on 8-quarter growth do not include the recession
in 1980 because of potential overlaps with the 1982 recession.
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higher than those of non-residential investment, both series show lower growth rates after trough
from the 1990s. This is also reﬂected in the tests of statistical diﬀerence. While for non-residential
investment we always reject the null hypothesis of equal mean of the growth rates pre and post
1990 at a signiﬁcance level below one percent, for the series of residential investment we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of equal mean of the 8-quarter growth rate after trough across the two
subsamples. As evident from the chart, the 8-quarter growth after trough of residential investment
has considerably decreased in the recent ﬁnancial crisis, but not in the previous two recessions.
Now we ﬁrst discuss developments of leverage and indebtedness of the non-ﬁnancial business
sector. Then we compute growth rates after trough of various measures of indebtedness. We ﬁnally
present some evidence on default rates and spreads. Financial data on the US non-ﬁnancial corporate
sector have extensively been discussed in the literature (Geanakoplos, 2010; Covas and Den Haan,
2011; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012, among many others). The left chart of Figure 3 shows an
increasing trend of leverage, deﬁned as the ratio between total assets and net worth, over the
period 1951Q42011Q4. The right chart of Figure 3 shows another measure of leverage, deﬁned
as the ratio between tangible assets and net worth (deﬁned as tangible assets minus credit market
liabilities). This latter measure is consistent with the DSGE model presented in the following
sections. Both charts show an increasing trend of leverage during the Great Moderation and a
remarkable deleveraging after the dot-com bubble followed by a rapid surge before the ﬁnancial
crisis  particularly evident for the second deﬁnition of leverage.
Table 2 reports some indicators of indebtedness of the non-ﬁnancial corporate business sector
for the whole sample, for the sample 1965Q1-2007Q4, and the two subsamples, 1965Q1-1983Q4
and 1984Q1-2007Q4. The leverage of the corporate business sector ranges from 1.59 over 1965Q1-
1983Q4 to 1.93 during the Great Moderation. A similar picture also holds for the other measure of
leverage, which is equal to 1.40 in the 1965Q1-1983Q4 sample and it rises to 1.77 during the Great
Moderation.
Figure 4 presents growth rates accumulated over 4-quarter and 8-quarter following each postwar
U.S. recession of real credit market instruments of the non-ﬁnancial corporate business sector. With
the exception of the 1975 crisis, the corporate sector tends to postpone its borrowing in the last
three recessions. This is also conﬁrmed in Table 1, which reports a signiﬁcant change in the speed
of recovery of real credit market instruments. The table also shows that the change in the growth
rates pre- and post-1990 of total liabilities is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
In the US ﬁnancial system bond markets represent the predominant way of supplying funds
(Allen et al., 2004). Corporate bonds account for almost 50% of total credit instruments of the
non-ﬁnancial corporate business sector in the post-WWII era, while depository institution loans
account for less than 25% as shown in Table 2. Figure 5 shows the 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth
rates after trough of real corporate bonds. Diﬀerently from the previous ﬁndings, in this case it is
not possible to detect a diﬀerence in the growth rates in the latest three recessions. As evident from
Table 1, both the 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth rates after trough are even higher since the 1990s,
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4-quarter growth 8-quarter growth
Pre-90 Post-90 Change Pre-90 Post-90 Change
GDP 7.63 2.62 5.01∗∗∗ 12.52 5.64 6.87∗∗∗
Consumption 5.19 2.76 2.43∗∗ 9.60 6.01 3.59∗∗∗
Investment 12.96 -1.32 14.28∗∗∗ 19.02 5.10 13.91∗∗∗
Residential investment 24.18 7.49 16.69∗ 28.80 14.02 14.79
Non-residential investment 8.56 -4.45 13.01∗∗∗ 16.62 1.43 15.19∗∗∗
Non-ﬁnancial corporate sector
Total liabilities 5.23 1.02 4.20∗∗ 11.76 0.69 11.07∗∗∗
Credit market instruments 3.61 -2.35 5.96∗∗∗ 10.64 -1.22 11.87∗∗
Corporate bonds 3.43 4.79 −1.37 8.05 11.39 −3.34∗
Depository institut. loans 1.76 -15.05 16.81∗∗∗ 10.47 -20.85 31.32∗∗∗
Non-ﬁnancial corporate and non-corporate sector
Total liabilities 5.57 0.39 5.18∗∗∗ 13.53 -2.34 15.87∗∗∗
Credit market instruments 4.71 -2.33 7.04∗∗∗ 7.79 -1.36 9.15∗
Household sector
Liabilities (home mortgages) 6.24 3.92 2.32 15.88 8.12 7.76
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote rejection of the null hypothesis of equal means at 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level,
respectively, of a one-sided t-test. Since the growth rates of corporate bonds are clearly higher in the second
period, we perform a left-tailed t-test. The 8-quarter growth rates do not take into account the
recession in 1980. Data on indebtedness start in 1951Q4.
Table 1: Speed of recoveries (in percent) in the two subsamples
and the diﬀerence of the 8-quarter speed of recovery is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level.3
Figure 6 shows growth rates accumulated over 4-quarter and 8-quarter following each postwar
U.S. recession of real depository institution loans. It is evident that the lower growth rates of credit
market instruments in the latest three recessions are driven by the developments of depository
institution loans. The diﬀerence in both the 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth rates of bank loans is
statistically signiﬁcant as shown in Table 1. Growth rates of loans can be explained by the change in
bank lending standards. Figure 7 shows the net percentage of domestic banks tightening standards
for commercial and industrial loans to large and middle-market ﬁrms from 1967Q1 to 2014Q1 (Lown
and Morgan, 2006). The negative growth rates of depository institutions loans, shown in Figure 6,
occur indeed in correspondence with tighter standards in 1974Q1, 1991Q1, 2001Q4 and 2009Q2.
We ﬁnally report some data on the non-ﬁnancial business sector which are used in the next
sections: default rates and corporate spreads. Annual data on default rates are shown in Figure 8.
Data show a clear counter-cyclical pattern; this is particularly evident in the last three recessions.
Average default rates at the time of the recessions in the Great Moderation are much higher than the
3In this case we perform a left-tailed t-test, i.e. the mean of the ﬁrst period is less than that of the second period.
It is worth noting that small and large ﬁrms obtain funds from diﬀerent sources: the former rely primarily on bank
credit to ﬁnance their investments, while the latter obtain a considerable portion of funding in direct markets (Gertler
and Gilchrist, 1993).
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1951Q4 1965Q1 1965Q1 1984Q1
2011Q4 2007Q4 1983Q4 2007Q4
Corporate bonds/credit market liabilities 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.47
Dep. inst. loans/credit market liabilities 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.19
Leverage: Total assets/ net worth 1.70 1.78 1.59 1.93
Leverage: tangible assets/ (tangible 1.58 1.61 1.40 1.77
assets-credit market instruments)
Annual default rates* 3.23 3.10 1.62 3.90
∗ The series starts in 1971. Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts and Altman and Kuehne (2012)
Table 2: Indicators of indebtedness of the non-ﬁnancial corporate business sector over diﬀerent
samples and annual default rates.
1951Q4 1965Q1 1965Q1 1984Q1
2011Q4 2007Q4 1983Q4 2007Q4
Moody's Baa  Aaa 97 102 113 94
Moody's Aaa  10Year Treasury constant maturity∗ 84 89 61 111
Moody's Baa  10Year Treasury constant maturity∗ 182 191 173 205
Spread by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)∗∗ 145 141 98 160
∗ The series of 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate starts in 1953q2.
∗∗ This measure starts in 1973Q1 and ends in 2010q3.
Source: ALFRED database St. Louis Fed and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)
Table 3: Time series of the spread (basis points)
corresponding values in the period 1971-1983. The mean annual default rate is less than 2 percent
during the 1971-1983 sample, and it increases to almost 4 percent during the Great Moderation.
In order to provide some information on the cost of borrowing, we present some proxies of the
external ﬁnance premium, i.e. the spread over the risk-free rate. Table 3 reports the following
measures of the spread: (i) the diﬀerence in yields between the lowest-rated (Moody's Baa) and
highest-rated (Moody's Aaa) investment-grade corporate bonds; (ii) the Moody's Aaa Corporate
Bond Yield spread over the 10-Year Treasury Yield at Constant Maturity (CM); Moody's Baa
Corporate Bond Yield spread over the 10-Year Treasury Yield at CM; and (iv) the series of the
spread constructed by Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012), based on prices of individual corporate bonds
traded in the secondary market. In the subsample 1984Q1-2007Q4 the spread is generally higher,
but for Moody's Baa minus Aaa. Figure 9 shows the series of the spread reported in the table in
the period 1965Q1-2012Q1.4 With the exception of the recent ﬁnancial crisis it is not possible to
detect any increasing trend in the diﬀerent measures of spread.
4The series by Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012) starts in 1973Q1 and ends in 2010Q3.
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3 The DSGE model
This section brieﬂy sketches a standard DSGE model with real and nominal frictions as in Smets and
Wouters (2007), which also features a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism à la Bernanke et al. (1999)
(BGG). The BGG model has been chosen for a variety of reasons. First, the seminal contribution
by BGG is an important reference point in the mainstream DSGE literature on ﬁnancial frictions.
Second, this model might address issues related to the ﬁnancial conditions of the non-ﬁnancial busi-
ness sector. Third it captures some of the mechanisms through which credit market conditions can
impact macroeconomic dynamics (see also Christiano et al., 2014): the ﬁrms balance sheet channel
is present, while the household balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel are absent. The
former channel stresses the importance of balance sheet conditions of debtors: when borrowers have
little wealth to contribute to the project ﬁnancing, the potential divergence of interests between bor-
rowers and lenders (the suppliers of external funds) is greater and, therefore, agency costs increase.
In equilibrium lenders must be compensated for higher agency costs by a larger external ﬁnance
premium, i.e. the diﬀerence between the cost of raising funds externally and the opportunity cost
of using internal ﬁnance. Therefore, the external ﬁnance premium depends inversely on borrowers'
net worth. Fluctuations in borrowers' balance sheets due to changes in asset prices and cash ﬂow
then aﬀect investment decisions and, hence, output.5
The economy is populated by: households; labor unions; labor packers; retailers; ﬁnal good ﬁrms;
capital producers; entrepreneurs; and the policymaker. Households consume, save, and supply la-
bor. A labor union diﬀerentiates labor and sets wages in a monopolistically competitive market.
Competitive labor packers buy labor service from the union, package and sell it to entrepreneurs.
In the goods market retailers buy goods from intermediate goods ﬁrms, diﬀerentiate them and sell
them in a monopolistically competitive market. The aggregate ﬁnal good is produced by perfectly
competitive ﬁrms assembling a continuum of intermediate goods. Capital producers purchase in-
vestment and depreciated capital to transform them into capital sold to entrepreneurs and used for
production. Entrepreneurs maximize the ﬂow of discounted proﬁts by choosing the quantity of fac-
tors for production and stipulate a ﬁnancial contract to obtain funds from lenders. For the ﬁnancing
decision there is a costly state veriﬁcation problem (Townsend, 1979) and lenders might have to pay
a ﬁxed auditing cost to observe an individual borrower's return. The policymaker sets the nominal
interest rate following a Taylor rule. Since the structure of model closely follows Smets and Wouters
(2007) and BGG, here we discuss those features needed to understand the following sections. The
system of all the linearized equilibrium conditions is shown in Appendix B.2.
5Alternatively, we could have investigated the bank lending channel, which focuses on the supply of intermediate
credit, in a model à la Gertler and Karadi (2011). However, in such a model an economy with more leveraged banks
can lend more compared to an economy with less leveraged banks. The model by Gertler and Karadi in fact requires
that the incentive compatibility constraint (between households and banks) is always satisﬁed; and, at any reasonable
calibrated level of indebtedness, banks can still aﬀord to lend. Hence, such a model is not a good candidate to answer
the research question of the paper.
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The representative household maximizes the utility function, which specializes as
Ut (·) = (Ct − hCt−1)
1−σc
1− σc exp
(
σc − 1
1 + σ`
(
Lht
)1+σ`)
(1)
where h measures the degree of superﬁcial external habits in consumption, σc is the parameter of
relative risk aversion, Lht is labour supply in terms of hours worked and σ
` measures the elasticity
of labour supply with respect to the real wage. The representative household enters period t with
nominal deposits in the banks, that pay the gross nominal interest rate, Rnt , between t and t + 1.
During period t, each household chooses to consume Ct; supplies Lht hours of work; and allocates
savings in deposits, Dt. Each household gains an hourly real wage, and dividend payments from
ﬁrms. The government grants transfers and imposes real lump-sum taxes.
Households supply homogeneous labour to monopolistic labour unions which diﬀerentiate it.
Labour service used by entrepreneurs is a composite of diﬀerentiated types of labour. As in Kimball
(1985) the price elasticity of demand is a function of relative prices. Labour unions adjust wages
infrequently following the Calvo scheme. Let σw be the probability of keeping wages constant;
hence, each period there is a constant probability (1−σw) that the union is able to adjust the wage,
independently of past history. For the other fraction that cannot adjust, the wage is automatically
increased at the aggregate inﬂation rate, where σwi denotes the degree of wage indexation. The
goods market has a similar structure: retailers purchase intermediate goods at a price equal to the
marginal cost and diﬀerentiate them in a monopolistically competitive market. Each retailer resets
its price with probability (1− σp) and σpi denotes the degree of price indexation.
Capital producers purchase at time t investment and depreciated capital to transform them into
capital sold to ﬁrms and used for production at time t + 1. The law of motion of capital is then
equal to
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + xt
[
1−z
(
It
It−1
)]
It (2)
where δ stands for depreciation. The adjustment cost function z satisﬁes the following properties:
z(1) = z′(1) = 0, and z′′(1) = ξ > 0. The shock to the marginal eﬃciency of investment, xt, follows
an AR(1) process, ρx is an autoregressive coeﬃcient and εxt is a serially uncorrelated, normally
distributed shock with zero mean and standard deviation σx. Proﬁts are given by the diﬀerence
between the revenue from selling capital at the relative price Qt and the costs of buying capital from
intermediate goods ﬁrms and the investment needed to build new capital. The optimality condition
is a Tobin's Q equation, which relates the price of capital to the marginal adjustment costs.
Entrepreneurs produce goods in a perfectly competitive market. They maximize the ﬂow of
discounted proﬁts by choosing the quantity of factors for production. The production function
specializes as
Yt = At(K˜t)
α (Lt)
1−α (3)
where K˜ = UtKt, Ut is the utilization rate and Lt =
(
Lht
)Ω
(Let )
1−Ω. Let is entrepreneurial labor
which, for simplicity, is equal to 1. At is the transitory productivity (TFP) shock following an AR(1)
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process, ρa is an autoregressive coeﬃcient and εat is a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed
shock with zero mean and standard deviation σa. The real gross aggregate ex-post return on capital
expenditures, Rkt+1, is equal to
Et
[
Rkt+1
]
= Et
[
Zkt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
]
(4)
where Zkt is the real rental price of capital, given by
Zkt = αMCt
Yt
K˜t
(5)
At the end of period t, entrepreneurs buy from capital producers capital, Kt+1, that will be used at
time t + 1 at the real price Qt. Capital purchases are ﬁnanced by internal and external ﬁnancing.
The former is given by net worth, Nt+1  net worth at the end of time t  and the latter by borrowing
from banks, Bt+1. In equilibrium total loans supplied to the entrepreneurs are equal to households
deposits, i.e. Bt = Dt. The amount of borrowing is deﬁned as
Bt+1 = QtKt+1 −Nt+1 (6)
The return to capital is sensitive to an idiosyncratic shock. The ex post gross return on capital for
entrepreneur j is ωjtR
k
t+1, where ω
j
t is an idiosyncratic disturbance to entrepreneur j return.
6 The
disturbance is an i.i.d. log-normal variable with standard deviation σ, ln(ω) ∼ N(−0.5σ2, σ2). Then
E[ω] = 1 and
E[ω|ω ≥ ω¯] = 1− Φ
N (z − σ)
1− ΦN (z) (7)
where ΦN (·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal and z ≡ (ln(ω¯)+
0.5σ2)/σ.
After the investment decision is made, the lender can observe ω only by paying the monitoring
cost, which is a proportion µ of the realized gross payoﬀ to the ﬁrm's capital, i.e. µωt+1Rkt+1QtKt+1.
The optimal ﬁnancial contract speciﬁes a cutoﬀ value for the idiosyncratic shock, ω¯, such that
if ω ≥ ω¯ the entrepreneur is able to repay the loan at the contractual rate Rlt. Alternatively,
if ω ≤ ω¯ the borrower gets nothing, the lender pays the auditing costs and his net receipts are
(1− µ)ωt+1Rkt+1QtKt+1. The threshold value, ω¯, is deﬁned as follows
ω¯t+1R
k
t+1QtKt+1 = R
l
tBt+1 (8)
Hence, if ω ≥ ω¯, the entrepreneur repays the lender the amount RltBt+1 and keeps the diﬀerence equal
to ωt+1Rkt+1QtKt+1 − RltBt+1. The entrepreneur oﬀers a state-contingent contract that guarantees
the lender an expected return equal to the riskless rate. The expected gross share of proﬁts going
6For the sake of simplicity we drop the j index. For aggregation see BGG.
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to the lender is deﬁned as follows
Γ(ω¯t+1) =
ˆ ω¯t+1
0
ωf(ω)dω + ω¯t
ˆ ∞
ω¯t+1
f(ω)dω
and Γ′(ω¯) = 1− F (ω¯), where F (ω¯) is the business failure rate.7
The ﬁnancial contract is chosen to maximise entrepreneurial utility subject to the participation
constraint for the lender:
max (1− Γ(ω¯t))RktQt−1Kt (9)
s.t. [Γ(ω¯t)− µG(ω¯t)]RktQt−1Kt = Rt−1(Qt−1Kt −Nt) (10)
where the net share of proﬁts going to the lender is Γ(ω¯t) − µG(ω¯t), the gross share is Γ(ω¯t) and
Γ′′(ω¯) = −f(ω¯). The monitoring costs are deﬁned as µG(ω¯t) = µ
´ ω¯t
0 ωf(ω)dω and G
′(ω¯t) = ω¯tf(ω¯).
The constraint, equation (10), assures that the return to lend to entrepreneurs, left hand side, should
be equal to the opportunity costs of lending, right hand side, where Rt−1 is the gross real interest
rate implied by the loan contract signed at time t − 1. Appendix F investigates the robustness of
the results in the case of nominal debt-contracts.
Let s = R
k
R , k =
QK
N (the leverage ratio), and λ the Lagrange multiplier. The ﬁrst order
conditions are:
ω¯ : Γ′(ω¯t)− λt
[
Γ′(ω¯t)− µG′(ω¯t)
]
= 0 (11)
k : {(1− Γ(ω¯t)) + λt [Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t)]} st − λt = 0 (12)
λ : [Γ(ω¯t)− µG(ω¯t)] stkt − (kt − 1) = 0 (13)
As shown in Appendix B.1, the spread can be expressed as a function of the leverage ratio. In
particular, the spread between the external ﬁnancing cost and the real interest rate can be written
as
E
[
Rkt+1
Rt
]
= EP
(
Nt+1
QtKt+1
)
bt (14)
where EP , the external ﬁnance premium, has the following properties: EP ′(·) < 0, EP ′(1) = 1;
and bt is a risk premium shock as in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013). As the borrower's equity
stake in a project Nt+1/QtKt+1 falls, i.e. the leverage ratio rises, the loan becomes riskier and the
cost of borrowing rises.
In order to ensure that entrepreneurial net worth will never be enough to fully ﬁnance capital
acquisitions, it is assumed that each entrepreneur survives until the next period with probability θ
and her expected lifetime is consequently equal to 1/(1− θ). Net worth is given by the sum of the
entrepreneurial equity, Vt, and what is earned by entrepreneurial labour in the production of goods,
Nt+1 = θVtε
n
t +W
e
t (15)
7The time index is dropped for briefness.
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where εnt is a wealth shock similarly to Fuentes-Albero (2014) and Mumtaz and Zanetti (2016).
Entrepreneurial equity is given by the diﬀerence between earning on assets and borrowing repay-
ments, including the monitoring costs
Vt = R
k
tQt−1Kt −
(
Rt−1 +
µG (ωt)R
k
tQt−1Kt
Qt−1Kt −Nt
)
(Qt−1Kt −Nt) (16)
The entrepreneurs that die consume the residual net worth. Entrepreneurial consumption is then
equal to
Cet = (1− θ)Vt (17)
The policymaker sets the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor rule
Rnt
Rn
=
(
Rnt−1
Rn
)ρi [(Πt
Π
)ρpi ( Yt
Y ∗t
)ρy]1−ρi ( Yt/Y ∗t
Yt−1/Y ∗t−1
)ρ∆y
εit (18)
where Y ∗t is the level of output that would prevail under ﬂexible prices and wages without the two
mark-up shocks, and εit is the monetary policy shock. The resource constraint completes the model:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + Ψ(Ut)Kt−1 + µG (ω¯t)RktQt−1Kt (19)
There are eight orthogonal structural shocks: the risk premium, the investment-speciﬁc technol-
ogy, the wealth, the monetary policy, the government, the TFP, the price mark-up, and the wage
mark-up shocks. The following linearized equilibrium conditions related to the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism can explain how the ﬁrms balance sheet channel is operational in the model:8
E
[
Rˆkt+1
]
− Rˆt = κ(Qˆt + kˆt+1 − nˆt+1) + bˆt (20)
Equation (20) states that the external ﬁnancing cost must equate the external ﬁnance premium,
gross of the real interest rate, Rˆt = Rˆnt − Πˆt+1. The external ﬁnance premium depends positively on
the leverage, Qˆt+ kˆt+1− nˆt+1. The parameter κ ≡ −∂EP∂N
K
N/K
EP = −EP
′(·)
Rk
N
KR measures the elasticity
of the external ﬁnance premium with respect to the leverage position of entrepreneurs and it depends
on the value of the idiosyncratic shock ω¯. This equation captures the eﬀects of borrowers' balance
sheets on the cost of external ﬁnance.
The evolution of net worth, equation (21), mainly depends on entrepreneurial equity of surviving
entrepreneurs:
nˆt+1 =
θ
γ
V
N
vˆt +
W e
γN
wˆet + e
n
t (21)
The role of wage income is indeed very small, given that under most calibrations, the fraction of
entrepreneurial labour is 0.01. The ratio of wage income to net worth, W e/N , is about 0.001, while
the ratio of entrepreneurial equity to net worth, V/N , is greater than one.9 The survival rate, θ,
8Lower case variables represent detrended variables, variables without time subscripts denote steady-state values,
and the hat denotes variables log-linearized around their steady state balanced growth path.
9In fact some papers (e.g. Christensen and Dib, 2008) ignore entrepreneurial labour since it exerts a negligible
impact on the dynamics of the model.
11
clearly aﬀects the persistence of net worth.
The evolution of entrepreneurial equity, equation (22), is aﬀected by steady state values of the
following ﬁnancial parameters: total monitoring costs, µG(ω¯), and its derivative; the threshold value
of the idiosyncratic shock, ω¯; the leverage ratio, K/N ; the gross real return on capital expenditures,
Rk; and the gross real nominal rate, R,
V
N
v̂t = [1− µG(ω¯)]Rkt
K
N
Rˆkt +
K
N
[
(1− µG(ω¯))Rk −R
] (
Qˆt−1 + kˆt
)
−
−K
N
µRkG′(ω¯)ω¯ ˆ¯ωt +R
(
K
N
− 1
)
Rˆt−1 +Rnˆt (22)
Equity clearly depends negatively on monitoring costs and on the threshold value of the idiosyn-
cratic shock. An increase in the steady state leverage ratio, on one hand, raises the amount of
assets and, hence, their return. On the other hand, it also implies higher borrowing repayments.
Higher steady state return on capital expenditures unambiguously raises entrepreneurial equity,
while a change in the steady state real interest rate aﬀects the borrowing decisions agreed in the
loan contract.
The threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock is governed by the following equation:
sˆt = [1− s [Γ(ω¯)− µG(ω¯)]]
{
Γ′′(ω¯)
Γ′(ω¯)
− [Γ
′′(ω¯)− µG′′(ω¯)]
Γ′(ω¯)− µG′(ω¯)
}
ω¯ ˆ¯ωt+1 (23)
The rationale of the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁnancial contract is that the higher the threshold
value, ω¯, the higher the spread, s.
By deﬁnition, borrowing, equation (24), depends positively on total assets and negatively on net
worth,
bˆt+1 =
(
1− N
K
)−1 (
Qˆt + kˆt+1
)
−
(
K
N
− 1
)−1
nˆt+1 (24)
The lower the steady state leverage ratio the higher is the impact of the value of assets and net
worth on the dynamics of debt.
Nonlinearities might arise from the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism, which should be stronger the
deeper the economy is in recession and the weaker the balance sheet of borrowers (Bernanke et al.,
1996; Mertens and Ravn, 2011). In fact, the ﬂight to quality implies that changes in net worth
induce a greater variation in the agency costs of lending for low-net-worth borrowers compared
to high-net-worth borrowers. Appendix C investigates these nonlinearities by examining how the
deep ﬁnancial parameters aﬀect steady state leverage, spread and elasticity of the external ﬁnance
premium with respect to the leverage position of entrepreneurs.
4 Results on the role of ﬁnancial factors
This section analyses the eﬀects of ﬁnancial factors in accounting for slow recoveries since the mid-
1980s. Section 4.1 discusses the estimation strategy. Section 4.2 presents counterfactual experiments
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Parameters
δ, depreciation rate 0.025
α, capital share 0.333
β, discount factor 0.9985
σc relative risk aversion 1.28
Ω, fraction of household labour 0.99
G
Y , government share of GDP 0.18
εp/εw, Kimball aggregator in the goods/labour market 33
Table 4: Calibrated parameters common to both samples
that investigate the role of ﬁnancial factors in aﬀecting the speed of recovery in the two estimated
samples, 1965Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2007Q4.10 Section 4.3 discusses transmission mechanisms via
the IRFs analysis.
4.1 Estimation strategy
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods over two samples, 1965Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-
2007Q4, using a set of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables. In particular, we use the following
observable eight variables: GDP, consumption, investment, wage, hours worked, GDP deﬂator in-
ﬂation, the federal funds rate and the spread. Appendix D presents a detailed discussion of data
sources, deﬁnitions and transformations. The number of variables in the data coincides with the
number of shocks in the model.
Table 4 shows the calibration of the parameters  common to the two samples  that cannot
be identiﬁed in the dataset and/or are related to steady state values of the variables. The time
period in the model corresponds to one quarter in the data. The depreciation rate, δ, is equal to
0.025, corresponding to an annual depreciation rate of 10%. The capital share, α, is one third.
The discount factor, β, and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, σc, are set equal to 0.9985 and
1.28 respectively, implying an annualised interest rate of 6.7%. Similarly to BGG the fraction of
household labour, Ω, is calibrated at 0.99 so that the share of income going to entrepreneurial labour
is small. The ratio of government spending to GDP is equal to 0.18. The Kimball aggregators in the
goods and labour market are calibrated at 33, with the price and wage mark-up at 1.1 (e.g. Coenen
et al., 2007).
In steady state the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock, ω¯, which determines the leverage,
the spread and the business failure rate, is a function of the following underlying parameters: δ,
α, β, σc, Ω, γ, Π, µ, σ and θ (equation (38) in Appendix B.1). The quarterly growth rate of real
GDP, consumption, investment and wage, γ and the steady state inﬂation rate are set consistently
with the series in the dataset over the two samples 1965Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2007Q4, as shown
in Table 5. The deep ﬁnancial parameters of the model are: (i) µ, the proportion of monitoring
10The dataset ends in 2007Q4 to avoid potential distortionary eﬀects on the estimates of the zero lower bound on
the nominal interest rate as in Galí et al. (2011). For the sake of robustness, Appendix E.1 shows the sensitivity of
the results when the dataset include the Great Recession.
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Parameters 1965Q1-1983Q4 1984Q4-2007Q4
γ, steady state common growth rate 1.00427 1.00439
Π, steady state inﬂation rate 1.0143 1.0063
µ, proportion of monitoring costs 0.245 0.105
σ, volatility of idiosyncratic shock 0.426 0.333
θ, survival rate of ﬁrms 0.9762 0.9813
Table 5: Calibration of sample-speciﬁc parameters
costs; (ii) σ, the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock; and (iii) θ, the survival rate of entrepreneurs.
The monitoring costs reﬂect the accounting and legal fees, asset liquidation, and interruption of
business in the case that the entrepreneur defaults on the debt contract. Monitoring costs reﬂect
the easiness of access to external ﬁnancing (Fuentes-Albero, 2014). This parameter broadly captures
the process of ﬁnancial deregulation of the mid 1980s in the US economy. Levin et al. (2004) ﬁnd that
monitoring costs exhibits substantial temporal variation over the 1997-2003 sample; on the contrary,
their estimates of the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock reveal little time variation across the
entire distribution of ﬁrms. Christiano et al. (2014) deﬁne exogenous variations to the volatility of
idiosyncratic uncertainty as risk shocks.11 The introduction of survival rate in this class of models,
instead, is a convenient assumption made in order to avoid full self-ﬁnancing by entrepreneurs. The
deep ﬁnancial parameters are set to target the following steady state values for the 1965Q1-1983Q4
sample: a leverage ratio of 1.40, a spread of 173 basis points per year and an annualised business
failure rate of less than two percent, in line with the data reported in Tables 2 and 3. Hence, the
deﬁnition of leverage consistent with the model does not include ﬁnancial assets, trade and taxes
payables, and miscellaneous liabilities as in Fuentes-Albero (2014) and the proxy of the spread is the
diﬀerence between Moody's Baa and 10 Year Treasury yield at constant maturity as in Del Negro
and Schorfheide (2013). This translates into setting the proportion of monitoring costs equal to
0.245, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to 0.426 and the survival rate to 0.9762.12
These values imply an elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium with respect to the leverage position
equal to 0.054. The 1984Q1-2007Q4 sample is characterised by a higher leverage, spread and business
failure rate, equal to 1.77, 205 basis points and about four percent per year, respectively. In order to
target these values the monitoring costs are equal to 0.105. A lower value in the period of the Great
Moderation captures the process of ﬁnancial deregulation of the mid 1980s in the US economy. The
volatility of the idiosyncratic shock is equal to 0.333, while the survival rate is equal to 0.9813. The
corresponding value of the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium with respect to the leverage
11They ﬁnd that risk shocks play an important role in driving business cycle ﬂuctuations. The eﬀects of these shocks
are similar to those of the risk premium shock in equation (20), since they both inﬂuence the demand for capital (by
aﬀecting the amount of credit extended to entrepreneurs).
12The deep ﬁnancial parameters are calibrated because they are not well identiﬁed in the data. Several contributions
compare the model by Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW) with a SW model augmented with the ﬁnancial accelerator
à la Bernanke et al. (1999) (see De Graeve, 2008; von Heideken, 2009; Villa, 2016, among many others). In all these
contributions the comparison of marginal data densities reveals that ﬁnancial frictions are empirically relevant since
they improve the ﬁt of the model. We rely on this literature because it shows that the ﬁnancial accelerator model is
not only accepted by the data but it also provides a gain in ﬁtting macroeconomic variables compared to a standard
SW economy.
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Prior distribution Posterior mean Posterior mean
Parameters Distr Mode St.Dev. 1965-1983 1984-2007
Structural
ξ, inv. adj. costs Normal 4 1.5 4.65 [2.85,6.34] 4.07 [2.09,5.96]
σ`, elasticity of work Normal 2 0.25 2.18 [1.81,2.56] 2.42 [2.06,2.77]
h, habit parameter Beta 0.7 0.1 0.41 [0.33,0.48] 0.29 [0.21,0.36]
σp, Calvo prices Beta 0.5 0.1 0.55 [0.50,0.59] 0.90 [0.83,0.95]
σw, Calvo wages Beta 0.5 0.1 0.86 [0.81,0.92] 0.87 [0.82,0.92]
σpi, price indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.33 [0.15,0.51] 0.36 [0.10,0.64]
σwi, wage indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.59 [0.41,0.77] 0.35 [0.14,0.56]
ζ, elasticity of capital util Beta 0.5 0.15 0.69 [0.52,0.86] 0.79 [0.69,0.90]
ρpi, Taylor rule Normal 1.5 0.25 1.55 [1.39,1.72] 1.53 [1.16,1.89]
ρy, Taylor rule Beta 0.125 0.05 0.03 [0.01,0.05] 0.12 [0.06,0.18]
ρ∆y , Taylor rule  changes in y Normal 0.2 0.05 0.23 [0.17,0.30] 0.28 [0.23,0.33]
ρi, Taylor rule smoothing Beta 0.75 0.1 0.51 [0.45,0.56] 0.81 [0.76,0.85]
¯`, steady state hours worked Normal 0 2 -1.32 [-3.21,0.67] 0.81 [-0.26,1.85]
s¯, steady state spread Normal 0.50 0.1 0.50 [0.34,0.67] 0.48 [0.32,0.64]
Shocks
ρa, per. of tech shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.98 [0.97,1.00] 0.96 [0.93,0.99]
ρb, per. of risk premium shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.88 [0.81,0.95] 0.92 [0.88,0.95]
ρg, per. of gov shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.96 [0.94,0.98] 0.94 [0.92,0.96]
ρx, per. of investment shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.55 [0.39,0.71] 0.58 [0.49,0.67]
ρi, per. of monetary shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.15 [0.05,0.24] 0.19 [0.08,0.30]
ρp, per. of price mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.67 [0.47,0.87] 0.70 [0.43,0.92]
ρw, per. of wage mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.61 [0.38,0.86] 0.64 [0.39,0.89]
ρn, per. of wealth shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.98 [0.97,1.00] 0.99 [0.98,1.00]
µp, MA  price mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.46 [0.20,0.71] 0.87 [0.77,0.98]
µw, MA  wage mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.48 [0.24,0.71] 0.92 [0.87,0.98]
ρga, per. of gov to tech shock Beta 0.5 0.25 0.53 [0.41,0.66] 0.45 [0.32,0.59]
σa, std of tech shock IG 0.1 2 0.81 [0.70,0.92] 0.45 [0.40,0.51]
σb, std of risk premium shock IG 0.1 2 0.10 [0.09,0.12] 0.06 [0.05,0.07]
σg, std of gov shock IG 0.1 2 0.52 [0.45,0.60] 0.38 [0.33,0.42]
σx, std of investment shock IG 0.1 2 0.75 [0.54,0.95] 0.56 [0.45,0.68]
σi, std of monetary shock IG 0.1 2 0.43 [0.36,0.50] 0.13 [0.11,0.15]
σp, std of price mark-up shock IG 0.1 2 0.20 [0.16,0.25] 0.18 [0.15,0.21]
σw, std of wage mark-up shock IG 0.1 2 0.19 [0.14,0.23] 0.37 [0.32,0.42]
σn, std of wealth shock IG 0.1 2 0.32 [0.24,0.40] 0.19 [0.15,0.23]
Table 6: Prior and posterior distributions in the two samples
position is equal to 0.037. As explained in Appendix C, lower monitoring costs imply that business
investment becomes less sensitive to ﬁnancial frictions.
Table 6 shows the posterior distributions of the remaining parameters estimated over two sample
periods. For each parameter the table reports the posterior mean with 95% probability intervals in
parentheses. During the Great Moderation the volatility of most shocks has decreased as evident
from Figure 10, that shows the smoothed shocks which are the main drivers of output and investment.
15
Some diﬀerences emerge for the structural parameters. The habit persistence parameter decreases in
the second sample, while the autoregressive coeﬃcient of the risk premium shock rises. The degree
of price stickiness is higher in the second sample, wage indexation to past inﬂation has fallen in the
second sample. Finally the second sample features a higher elasticity of capital utilization. As noted
by Galí et al. (2012), it is diﬃcult to assess whether these changes are due to weak identiﬁcation or
to an eﬀective change in the economic structure.
4.2 Counterfactual experiments
The counterfactual experiment allows to analyse the role of the parameters in accounting for slower
recoveries since mid 1980s. As a ﬁrst step, for the baseline estimated models we compute the
speed of recovery of the simulated series of GDP, investment, consumption and borrowing for the
two samples. Sample 1 considers the four recessions from 1965Q1 to 1983Q4 (i.e. 1970Q3, 1975Q1,
1980Q2 and 1982Q3), while sample 2 takes into account the two recessions in 1991Q1 and in 2001Q4.
The diﬀerence between growth rates after NBER recessions of Table 1 and of Table 7 is due to the
fact that: (i) the former are coming from the data, the latter from the estimated model; (ii) the
observable variables used in the model are logged and expressed in per capita terms diﬀerently from
the data; and (iii) the episodes of recessions are diﬀerent. As shown in Table 7, in sample 1 the speed
of recovery of the logged per capita series of GDP is 3.80, that of investment is 6.93, and that of
consumption is 2.93. And they are higher than those in sample 2. The model is also able to replicate
the slower recovery of non-ﬁnancial corporate sector borrowing in the Great Moderation, although
borrowing is not included as observable variable in the dataset. In fact, the 4-quarter growth rate
of borrowing is 1.07 in the ﬁrst sample and it decreases to -5.34 in the second sample.
Following Galí et al. (2012), the counterfactual experiment for sample 1 consists in simulating the
model economy imposing the deep ﬁnancial parameters (and all the estimated structural parameters)
of sample 2, while keeping all the smoothed shocks estimated in the previous sample. In such a way
it is possible to simulate the outcomes of sample 1-shocks with sample 2-parameters. We then
compute the speed of recovery of GDP, investment, consumption and borrowing, i.e. the average
4-quarter growth rate after recession. Similar procedure is used to run counterfactual experiments
for sample 2.
Sample 1 features lower leverage, spread and business failure rates, equal to 1.40, 173 basis points
per year and about 2% per year respectively. Sample 2 instead features a leverage of 1.77, a spread
of 205 basis points per year and a business failure rate of almost 4%. In the model estimated for
sample 1 the ﬁrst counterfactual simulation consists in imposing the ﬁnancial parameters of sample
2. The counterfactual exercise shows that there is indeed a slower recovery by changing the ﬁnancial
parameters: the average growth rate of GDP is 3.80 in the model estimated for sample 1 and 3.78
in the counterfactual model. The growth rate of investment is also aﬀected, with an average growth
rate of 6.93 in the model estimated for the ﬁrst sample and 6.51 in the counterfactual model. There
is no eﬀect on consumption whose growth rate is 2.93. The growth rate of borrowing is 1.80 in
the counterfactual model. Two main reasons explain this result. First, equation (24) shows that a
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Baseline Counterfactuals
Financial parameters Structural and ﬁnancial
Sample 1: 1965-1983 of sample 2 parameters of sample 2
GDP 3.80 3.78 2.06
Investment 6.93 6.51 3.41
Consumption 2.93 2.93 1.71
Borrowing 1.07 1.80 0.52
Financial parameters Structural and ﬁnancial
Sample 2: 1984-2007 of sample 1 parameters of sample 1
GDP 1.12 1.30 0.05
Investment -3.17 -2.24 -6.87
Consumption 1.27 1.03 0.38
Borrowing -5.34 -7.77 -9.10
Table 7: Average 4-quarter growth rates after trough
higher steady state leverage ratio causes a smaller impact of the value of assets and net worth on the
dynamics of borrowing. Capital and net worth are state variables, which slowly revert back to steady
state. Therefore, when leverage is high, those state variables aﬀect to a minor extent movements in
borrowing, the growth rate of which becomes faster. Second, during the recovery phase borrowers
have easier access to credit. The stronger ﬁnancial accelerator in a highly leveraged economy 
measured by a higher elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium  also causes a faster recovery of
credit. Overall, ﬁnancial factors play a role in accounting for the speed of recovery, but it turns out to
be small. We then simulate the outcomes of the pre-83Q4 shocks with the post-83Q4 parameters in
place  both estimated structural and calibrated ﬁnancial parameters. In this counterfactual model
the average growth rate of GDP becomes 2.06, the growth rate of investment 3.41, the growth rate
of consumption 1.71 and that of borrowing 0.52. Although the diﬀerence in growth rates between
the estimated model and the counterfactual one is larger than that in the previous experiment, the
diﬀerence in the mean growth rates across the two speciﬁcations is not statistically signiﬁcant based
on a one-sided t-test.
Table 7 also presents a similar exercise for sample 2. Data shows that the mean growth rates after
trough of GDP is 1.12, of investment is −3.17, of consumption is 1.27 and of borrowing is −5.34. The
speed of recovery of GDP, investment, consumption and borrowing is indeed much slower since the
1990s. The ﬁrst counterfactual simulation consists in imposing the ﬁnancial parameters of sample
1. This experiment shows that an economy with lower leverage, spread and business failure rate
recovers faster: the average growth rate after trough of GDP is equal to 1.30 and of investment is
equal to −2.24. Hence ﬁnancial factors aﬀect the speed of recovery, but the diﬀerence in the mean
growth rates is not statistically signiﬁcant. The use of sample 1-parameters leads to an even slower
recovery.13 This result is mainly explained by the diﬀerent monetary policy parameters as shown in
Appendix E.2.
13The diﬀerence in the mean growth rates of GDP and investment between the baseline speciﬁcation and the
counterfactual is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% signiﬁcance level.
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Structural shocks
Wealth Risk Gov. Mon. Invest. TFP Price Wage
premium spending policy speciﬁc mark-up mark-up
Output growth 7.15;8.64 0.22;0.68 9.30;16.18 11.26;12.32 10.29;20.71 54.59;34.55 4.67;6.60 2.53;0.31
Investment growth 34.22;27.57 1.17;2.66 0.09;0.15 1.50;3.62 53.77;62.44 7.05;1.68 0.96;1.20 1.23;0.67
Inﬂation 53.55;17.67 0.74;0.18 3.84;0.63 1.92;0.65 4.92;1.48 11.93;1.74 15.92;68.60 7.18;9.05
Interest rate 61.98;52.43 0.99;2.20 4.22;5.10 9.00;5.95 8.51;20.10 7.07;4.40 4.60;2.77 3.61;7.04
Table 8: Variance decomposition. The ﬁrst number refers to the model estimated over the 1965-1983
sample while the second to the model estimated over the 1984-2007 sample
There are several reasons that could explain the limited role of ﬁnancial factors in explaining
the slow recoveries in the estimated model. First, the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is likely to
exert an eﬀect more on the depth of the simulated recession rather than its persistence. Second,
the Great Moderation is characterized by lower monitoring costs, which in turn implies a weaker
ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect. Third, the BGG model does not distinguish among sources of external
ﬁnance. So it is not possible to disentangle developments in bank loans versus corporate bonds,
which show considerable heterogeneity. Finally, the value of leverage in sample 1 is 1.40, while it is
1.77 in sample 2. Appendix C shows some important non-linearities in the deep ﬁnancial parameters.
The observed diﬀerence in the leverage might not be large enough to generate substantial diﬀerent
dynamics in the model. It should also be noted that the slow recovery could be due to labour market
mismatch (ahin et al., 2014).
Given that the role of structural parameters is limited in aﬀecting the speed of recovery, we now
turn to the analysis of the variance decomposition to assess the importance of exogenous sources of
ﬂuctuations. Table 8 shows the TFP shock is the main driver of output growth in both samples.
Monetary policy shocks play a non-negligible role in aﬀecting GDP ﬂuctuations, accounting for about
12% of its variation in both samples. As far as investment is concerned, there are some diﬀerences
between the two samples. In the ﬁrst sample the investment-speciﬁc technology shock accounts
for about half of the ﬂuctuations in investment growth, and the wealth shock explains 34% of its
ﬂuctuations, while in the second sample the investment-speciﬁc technology shock plays an even more
important role. Overall, for both samples, the wealth and the investment-speciﬁc technology shocks
account for about 90% of investment ﬂuctuations. Wealth shocks play a role also in explaining
inﬂation and the nominal interest rate, while mark-up shocks mainly aﬀect movements in inﬂation.
4.3 Impulse response function analysis
This section discusses the impulse responses to the TFP, wealth and investment-speciﬁc technology
shocks, which are the most important drivers of the US business cycle, as shown in Table 8. We
conduct three diﬀerent exercises. First, we show response functions of the models estimated over the
two samples. Then, in order to disentangle the role of ﬁnancial parameters, we estimate the model
over the entire sample and we show IRFs for a model with sample 1 ﬁnancial parameters versus
one with sample 2 ﬁnancial parameters. Finally, we investigate whether there exists a relationship
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between the speed of recovery from recessions and the magnitude of corporate leverage by changing
a ﬁnancial parameter at a time and reporting the impulse responses.
Figure 11 reports impulse responses of the two models: the one estimated over sample 1, 1965-
1983; and the model estimated over sample 2, 1984-2007. The size of the shock is normalised to one
standard deviation in all the charts.
The ﬁrst row of Figure 11 shows the simulated recession driven by a TFP shock. This shock has
a direct impact on output by making input less productive. The fall in the marginal productivity
of capital leads to a fall in the return on capital expenditures, Rkt . This in turn causes a decline
in the value of the ﬁrm and hence in net worth, as evident from equations (21) and (22). The fall
in net worth leads to a decrease in assets and hence generates a further retrenchment in capital
and investment. The TFP shock causes a rise in the leverage which leads to an initial increase in
the external ﬁnancing costs, leading to a fall in borrowing. There are some crucial parameters that
aﬀect the depth of the recession and that are diﬀerent from the two samples. The degree of price
stickiness is higher during the Great Moderation, with retailers reoptimising prices almost every 2
and a half years compared to 2 quarters in the ﬁrst sample. The interest rate smoothing is higher
in sample 2 as well as the elasticity of capital utilisation. Since retailers change prices more often in
sample 1, this causes a rise in inﬂation which is more pronounced. In addition, it is more costly to
change the utilisation rate of capital in sample 2  the elasticity is equal to 0.79, while it is equal to
0.69 in sample 1. Hence, a lower utilization rate further depresses aggregate production. In terms
of growth rates after the trough, the 4-quarter growth rate is equal to 0.07 in sample 1, higher than
the corresponding growth rate in sample 2, equal to 0.03. Hence the second sample features a slower
recovery.
The immediate eﬀect of a contractionary wealth shock is to decrease net worth, as evident
from equation (21). The reduction in internal ﬁnancing makes entrepreneurs more depending on
external ﬁnancing, hence debt increases. As a result, there is a higher probability of default and
the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock rises. Lenders hence require a higher premium. This
causes a reduction in investment, and output due to the higher borrowing costs. The downward shift
in aggregate demand leads to a fall in inﬂation. In both sample this shock is highly persistent, with
an autoregressive coeﬃcient of 0.98 in the ﬁrst period and of 0.99 in the Great Moderation. This
explains why the fall in net worth is even more long lasting in the second sample. The four-quarter
growth rate after the trough of output is equal in the two samples. Hence, the response of output
to a wealth shock does not feature a slower recovery during the Great Moderation.
The last row of Figure 11 shows the eﬀects of an investment-speciﬁc technology shock. A con-
tractionary investment-speciﬁc technology shock implies a rise in the price of capital, Qt. But a
change in the price of capital has two eﬀects: (i) investment falls; and (ii) net worth of ﬁrms in-
creases due to the higher return on capital. The latter eﬀect causes a fall in the spread. This causes
a less pronounced decline in investment. The presence of ﬁnancial frictions, therefore, attenuates
the fall in investment and output (see also Christensen and Dib, 2008). This shock does not repli-
cate the positive co-movement between output and investment, at least on impact, as also noted by
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Villa (2016). The higher steady state leverage and the lower value of monitoring costs in sample 2,
equation (22), explains the more pronounced increase in net worth, which leads to a stronger fall in
the spread and a weaker fall in investment. The lower degree of price stickiness in sample 1 causes
a fall in inﬂation which is more pronounced in this sample. The nominal interest rate increases by
more in the ﬁrst sample and this causes a more severe retrenchment in capital and investment. The
four-quarter growth rate after the trough of output is 0.24 in the ﬁrst sample and 0.27 in the second
sample. Hence, the speed of recovery is slightly higher in the ﬁrst sample.
Figure 11 makes it diﬃcult to disentangle the role of ﬁnancial versus structural parameters in
aﬀecting the speed of recovery. Hence, we estimate the model over the whole period, 1965Q1-2007Q4,
calibrating the ﬁnancial parameters to the values reported in Tables 2 and 3.14 We then show in
Figure 12 impulse responses for a model with sample 1 ﬁnancial parameters versus one with sample
2 ﬁnancial parameters, while all the other parameters are the same between the two speciﬁcations.
This exercise helps to isolate, from a graphical point of view, the role of ﬁnancial conditions of
the corporate sector in aﬀecting the speed of recovery. Several results emerge. First, although the
diﬀerent ﬁnancial conditions aﬀect the responses of net worth and the spread, the overall impact
on output and investment is small. As far as the TFP shock is concerned, the impulse responses of
output and investment almost coincide under the two scenarios. Second, under sample 1 ﬁnancial
parameters there is a greater impact of a lower steady state leverage on the dynamics of debt, as
explained in Section 3. This is particularly evident for the wealth shock. Third, an economy with
a higher leverage and spread features a more severe recession in response to the investment-speciﬁc
technology shock, but the speed of recovery is not aﬀected. This ﬁgure conﬁrms that the ﬁnancial
conditions of the corporate sector marginally aﬀect the speed of recovery.
A natural question then arises: is there any parameterization of ﬁnancial conditions that has
a considerable impact on the model dynamics? Figure 13 shows impulse responses under four
alternative scenarios: (i) sample 1 but with a period of changing prices of 6 quarters (σp = 0.835);
(ii) a model where the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock, σ, is equal to 0.05, while all the other
parameters are those of scenario (i); (iii) a model where monitoring costs, µ, are equal to 0.001,
with all the other parameters of scenario (i); and (iv) a model where the survival rate, θ, is equal
to 0.925, with all the other parameters of scenario (i). Hence in each model we change one ﬁnancial
parameter at a time. The latter three models imply a higher leverage equal to 5.83, 5.36, and 1.82
for σ = 0.05, µ = 0.001 and θ = 0.925 respectively. While the ﬁrst two models feature a low steady
state spread, changing θ leads to an implausible high spread, greater than a thousand basis points
py. We impose a higher degree of price stickiness than that of sample 1 because in the presence
of stickier prices the change in inﬂation is moderate and so is the change in the nominal interest
rate. This clearly aﬀects the dynamics of capital and investment, allowing ﬁnancial factors to play
a larger role. This is a ceteris paribus exercise since σp is the same in all the four scenarios.
Under this alternative parameterization, ﬁnancial factors do aﬀect the dynamic properties of the
model. As far as the depth of the recession is concerned, lower monitoring costs and volatility of the
14Table 20 in Appendix shows the posterior distributions of parameters and shocks.
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idiosyncratic shock make the recession less severe in the case of the wealth shock due to the limited
ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect. In fact, with σ and µ low, the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock
is around 0.90, which implies a low elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium. In the case of the
investment shock, the contraction in investment is more pronounced because there is a much weaker
fall in the spread. The model with a low θ, instead, features a larger response of the spread due to the
higher value of the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium. A stronger ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect
causes a more severe contraction in output and investment in the case of the TFP and wealth shock,
while a moderate fall in real variables in the case of the investment shock, which is characterized by
the decline in the spread.
The role of ﬁnancial conditions as an endogenous cause of slower recovery is limited in response
to the TFP shock and the wealth shock. It is worth noting that those shocks feature a high per-
sistence, with an AR (1) coeﬃcient of 0.98, as shown in Table 6. The lower exogenous persistence
of the investment-speciﬁc technology shock  whose AR (1) coeﬃcient is 0.55  makes the ﬁnancial
conditions of the corporate sector relevant. In fact, the 4-quarter growth rate after trough is 0.25
in sample 1, and it decreases to 0.14 when µ is equal to 0.01 and to 0.17 for σ = 0.05. Hence the
models featuring higher leverage experience a slower recovery, as observed in the data. The model is
thus able to imply a relationship between the speed of recovery from recessions and the magnitude
of corporate leverage in these cases.
We further investigate the role of endogenous versus exogenous factors aﬀecting the speed of
recovery. We conduct another counterfactual experiment where we impose that the TFP and the
wealth shocks have the same persistence and standard deviation of the investment-speciﬁc technology
shock  whose persistence is lower than that of the other two shocks. We then simulate the outcomes
of the pre-83Q4 shocks (where TFP and wealth shocks are modiﬁed) with the post-83Q4 ﬁnancial
parameters in place. The purposes of this exercise are mainly two: ﬁrst, investigating the role of less
persistent shocks and, second, disentangling the role of shocks versus ﬁnancial factors in causing the
slow recoveries. The eﬀect of less persistent TFP and wealth shocks leads to a slower recovery in
an economy featuring a higher leverage. In fact, the 4-quarter growth rate of GDP becomes equal
to 2.71, while it is equal to 3.80 in the baseline speciﬁcation and it is equal to 3.78 in the model
featuring only the ﬁnancial parameters of sample 2, as shown in Table 7. The 4-quarter growth rate
of investment becomes 6.26 and that of consumption 1.40. This experiment makes it clear that the
exogenous processes are the main reason for the slow recoveries during the recent period, in line
with the ﬁndings of Galí et al. (2012).
5 Concluding remarks
This paper analyses whether ﬁnancial conditions of the corporate business sector can account for
the slow recoveries since the mid-1980s.
Data on the US post-WWII economy show that the change in the speed of recovery of output since
the mid-1980s is also mirrored by a corresponding change in the 4- and 8- quarter growth rate after
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trough of investment and bank borrowing by the corporate sector. However, the 4-quarter growth
rate of corporate bonds is higher during the Great Moderation, revealing diﬀerent developments of
corporate indebtedness depending on the sources of external ﬁnance. The paper also documents
that leverage and the business failure rate in the corporate business sector have increased since the
mid-1980s, while the external ﬁnance premium has not risen that much.
In a DSGE model with a ﬁnancial accelerator à la Bernanke et al. (1999) we show that an
economy featuring a lower leverage recovers faster, but the diﬀerence in the growth rates between a
model economy with lower and higher leverage is not statistically signiﬁcant. Financial conditions in
the business sector aﬀect only marginally the diﬀerence in the growth rates of output, investment and
consumption, before and after the mid-1980s. This result is conﬁrmed by impulse response function
analysis. Several reasons can explain this result. First, the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is likely
to exert a stronger impact on the depth of the simulated recession rather than on its persistence.
Second, the process of ﬁnancial deregulation during the Great Moderation, captured in the model
by the reduction in monitoring costs, implies a weaker ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect. Third, the DSGE
model does not distinguish between alternative sources of external ﬁnance, which display diﬀerent
growth rates after trough since the mid-1980s. Finally, non-linearities can have considerable impact
on the model dynamics. The diﬀerence in the values of leverage across the two samples might be
not large enough to generate a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the speed of recovery. Galí et al. (2012) ﬁnd
that the risk premium and the investment shocks, as well as adverse wage markup and monetary
policy shocks, are the main factors behind the slow recoveries. A deeper analysis on the structural
interpretation of these shocks could help understand the slower speed of recoveries in the US economy
since the mid-1980s.
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Figure 1: Speed of recovery of GDP, consumption and investment
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Figure 2: Speed of recovery of residential and non-residential investment
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Figure 3: The left chart shows data on the leverage (total assets/net worth) of the non-ﬁnancial
corporate business sector. In the right chart leverage is computed as the ratio between tangible
assets and net worth, deﬁned as tangible assets minus credit market liabilities. Source: Flow of
Funds Accounts, Federal Reserve Board, Table B.102
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Figure 7: Net percentage change in lending standards for C&I loans to large and middle-market
ﬁrms. Between 1984 and 1990 the Senior Loan Oﬃcer Opinion Survey has not been conducted.
Source: Lown and Morgan (2006)
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Figure 11: Impulse responses to TFP, wealth and investment-speciﬁc technology shocks. Dashed
lines represent mean responses and dotted lines represent the 95% conﬁdence intervals. The size of
the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation. Sample 1 refers to the period 1965-1983, while
sample 2 to the period 1984-2007
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Figure 12: Impulse responses to TFP, wealth and investment-speciﬁc technology shocks in the model
estimated over the entire sample (1965-2007). Sample 1 refers to the period 1965-1983, while sample
2 to the period 1984-2007
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Figure 13: Impulse responses to TFP, wealth and investment-speciﬁc technology shocks. Sample 1
refers to the period 1965-1983
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Appendix
A Data Appendix
Data on real output, real personal consumption expenditure and real ﬁxed private investment are
taken from NIPA Table 1.1.5 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Data on the corporate ﬁnancial sector are taken from the Flow of Funds of the Federal Reserve
Board, Table B.102. Non-ﬁnancial assets consist of real estate (at market value), equipment and
software, and inventories (at replacement cost). Credit market instruments consist of commercial
paper, municipal securities, corporate bonds, depository institutions loans, other loans and advances,
and mortgages. Total liabilities consist of credit market instruments, corporate equities, trade
payables, taxes payables and miscellaneous liabilities, of the non-ﬁnancial corporate business sector.
The dataset start in 1951Q4, hence the 1949 recession is not included. Financial data are deﬂated
using the GDP deﬂator.
The analysis of growth rates after trough of alternative measures of indebtedness of the non-
ﬁnancial corporate sector does not assume any causal relationship with GDP. A detailed discussion
on the ﬁnance-growth nexus is well beyond the scope of the paper. Notwithstanding this, cross-
correlation analysis could provide a clearer picture on the lag/lead relationships between corporate
indebtedness and GDP. Table 9 shows the cross-correlation between HP component of corporate
debt and HP component of GDP.15 All the measures of corporate debt are pro-cyclical, with the
exception of corporate bonds, which is almost a-cyclical. Total liabilities, credit market liabilities
and depository institution loans lag the cycle by approximately one year, while corporate bonds lag
the cycle by more than two years. The paper investigates the diﬀerent mechanisms through which
corporate indebtedness might aﬀect GDP, but it is important to take into account that corporate
indebtedness is endogenously determined. A DSGEmodel is an appropriate instrument to investigate
these issues.
This appendix also presents some data on the liability side of the household sector and of all
commercial banks in the US economy.
Data on household indebtedness (Table B.100, Flow of Funds) reveal that households leverage,
i.e. the ratio between the value of real estate and the owners' equity in real estate, has dramatically
increased only in the latest ﬁnancial crisis. As shown in Figure 14, it is not possible to detect a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in growth rates pre- and post-1990 for indebtedness of the households
sector. This result is conﬁrmed in Table 10, which reports also the average 4-quarter and 8-quarter
growth rates of home mortgage liabilities. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal mean of
both the 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth rates pre- and post- 1990.16
Table 10 also shows the 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth rates of indebtedness of all commercial
banks (Table H.8, Federal Reserve Board). Data are available from 1973Q1. Hence, this exercise
considers only three recessions before the 1990s. Total liabilities are given by the sum of deposits,
15Results are qualitatively similar when applying a Band-pass ﬁlter.
16For the role of households indebtedness in recent times see Justiniano et al. (2013), among others.
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Variable Tot. liabilities Credit mark. liabilities Corporate bonds Depos. institut. loans
t=-12 0.03 -0.11 0.24 -0.27
t=-11 0.12 -0.01 0.25 -0.17
t=-10 0.20 0.09 0.26 -0.07
t=-9 0.29 0.18 0.25 0.03
t=-8 0.36 0.28 0.25 0.13
t=-7 0.42 0.40 0.24 0.29
t=-6 0.46 0.50 0.21 0.42
t=-5 0.47 0.55 0.14 0.52
t=-4 0.46 0.57 0.08 0.58
t=-3 0.44 0.55 0.01 0.59
t=-2 0.39 0.51 -0.04 0.55
t=-1 0.33 0.45 -0.06 0.49
t=0 0.24 0.36 -0.04 0.40
t=1 0.13 0.26 0.01 0.28
t=2 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.14
t=3 -0.10 0.05 0.07 0.03
t=4 -0.21 -0.04 0.07 -0.05
t=5 -0.32 -0.10 0.07 -0.12
t=6 -0.39 -0.16 0.05 -0.16
t=7 -0.43 -0.20 0.02 -0.21
t=8 -0.42 -0.23 0.00 -0.26
t=9 -0.39 -0.25 -0.03 -0.28
t=10 -0.33 -0.27 -0.07 -0.25
t=11 -0.26 -0.27 -0.11 -0.22
t=12 -0.16 -0.26 -0.15 -0.17
Table 9: Cross-correlation with GDPt+k
borrowings, trading liabilities and other liabilities; deposits account for 77% of total liabilities over
the sample period. Similarly to the household sector, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal
mean of both the 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth rates pre- and post- 1990. The last row of Table 10
shows the growth rates of borrowing of all commercial banks, which is the sum of borrowings from
banks in the US and from others. The diﬀerence in both the 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth rates
of borrowing is not statistically signiﬁcant. As evident from Figure 15, growth rates are diﬀerent
only in the latest crisis.
B The Model
B.1 The ﬁnancial contract
As explained by Bernanke et al. (1999), the optimal ﬁnancial contract speciﬁes a cutoﬀ value for the
idiosyncratic shock, ω¯, such that if ω ≥ ω¯ the entrepreneur is able to repay the loan. Alternatively,
if ω ≤ ω¯ the borrower gets nothing, the lender pays the auditing costs and his net receipts are
(1 − µ)ωt+1Rkt+1QtKt+1. Let ω¯ be the threshold value of the shock ω such that if ω ≥ ω¯ the
31
   
-0.04
0.00
0.04
0.08
0.12
1954q2 1958q2 1961q1 1970q4 1975q1 1980q3 1982q4 1991q1 2001q4 2009q2
4-quarter growth after trough
-0.08
0.00
0.08
0.16
0.25
1954q2 1958q2 1961q1 1970q4 1975q1 1982q4 1991q1 2001q4 2009q2
8-quarter growth after trough
Figure 14: Speed of recovery of real debt (home mortgages) by households
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Figure 15: Speed of recovery of real borrowings by all commercial banks
4-quarter growth 8-quarter growth
Pre-90 Post-90 Change Pre-90 Post-90 Change
Household sector
Liabilities (home mortgages) 6.24 3.92 2.32 15.88 8.12 7.76
All commercial banks
Total liabilities 1.88 0.52 1.35 4.68 2.01 2.67
Borrowings -0.24 -3.52 3.28 6.85 -9.87 16.72
∗ denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of equal means at 10% signiﬁcance level of a one-sided t-test.
The 8-quarter growth rates do not take into account the recession in 1980.
Table 10: Speed of recoveries (in percent) of diﬀerent measure of household and ﬁnancial-sector
indebtedness in the two subsamples
entrepreneur is able to repay the loan at the contractual rate Rlt. The threshold value, ω¯, is deﬁned
by:
ω¯t+1R
k
t+1QtKt+1 = R
l
tBt+1 (25)
In this case the entrepreneur repays the lender the amount RltBt+1 and keeps the diﬀerence equal to
ωt+1R
k
t+1QtKt+1−RltBt+1. If ω < ω¯, the entrepreneur declares default, the lender pays the auditing
costs and his net receipts are (1−µ)ωt+1Rkt+1QtKt+1. The entrepreneur receives nothing. The loan
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contract must satisfy the condition that the return on the loan to the entrepreneur must be equal
to the opportunity cost of lending, in terms of the risk free rate. And the entrepreneur wants to
maximize its expected return deﬁned as:
E
{ˆ ∞
ω¯t+1
ωdF (ω)Rkt+1QtKt+1 − [1− F (ω¯t+1)] ω¯t+1Rkt+1QtKt+1
}
where the second term represents the cost of borrowing. The optimal contracting problem can thus
be written as:
max
K,ω¯
(1− Γ(ω¯t))RktQt−1Kt (26)
s.t. [Γ(ω¯t)− µG(ω¯t)]RktQt−1Kt = Rt(Qt−1Kt −Nt) (27)
where the net share of proﬁts going to the lender is Γ(ω¯) − µG(ω¯), the gross share is Γ(ω¯) =´ ω¯
0 ωf(ω)dω+ ω¯
´∞
ω¯ ωf(ω)dω, Γ
′(ω¯) = 1−F (ω¯), Γ′′(ω¯) = −f(ω¯). The monitoring costs are deﬁned
as µG(ω¯) = µ
´ ω¯
0 ωf(ω)dω and G
′(ω¯) = ω¯f(ω¯).
Deﬁne s = R
k
R , k =
QK
N (the leverage ratio), and λ the Lagrange multiplier. The ﬁrst order conditions
are:
ω¯ : Γ′(ω¯t)− λt
[
Γ′(ω¯t)− µG′(ω¯t)
]
= 0 (28)
k : {(1− Γ(ω¯t)) + λt [Γ(ω¯t)− µG(ω¯t)]} st − λt = 0 (29)
λ : [Γ(ω¯t)− µG(ω¯t)] stkt − (kt − 1) = 0 (30)
Then
λt =
Γ′(ω¯t)
[Γ′(ω¯t)− µG′(ω¯t)] (31)
st =
λt
λt [Γ(ω¯t)− µG(ω¯t)] + (1− Γ(ω¯t)) (32)
kt =
1
(1− [Γ(ω¯t)− µG(ω¯t)] st) (33)
Therefore s, k and λ are function of ω¯. When µ = 0, then λ = 1 and s = 1; hence ﬁnancial
markets become frictionless.
Combining equation (32) with equation (33)  removing time index for briefness  it is possible
to express the spread, s(ω¯) = λ(ω¯)Ψ(ω¯) where Ψ(ω¯) = λ(ω¯) [Γ(ω¯)− µG(ω¯)] + (1 − Γ(ω¯)), as a function
of the leverage ratio, k(ω¯) = Ψ(ω¯)(1−Γ(ω¯)) ,
s =
λ(ω¯)
1− Γ(ω¯)k
−1 (34)
The following equations show how to compute the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium
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with respect to the leverage, κ:
κ = −d log s
d log k
d log s
dω¯
=
d [log λ(ω¯)− log Ψ(ω¯)]
dω¯
=
1
λ(ω¯)
λ′(ω¯)− 1
Ψ(ω¯)
Ψ′(ω¯)
d log k
dω¯
=
d [log Ψ(ω¯)− log(1− Γ(ω¯))]
dω¯
=
1
Ψ(ω¯)
Ψ′(ω¯) +
1
(1− Γ(ω¯))Γ
′(ω¯)
Hence:
κ = −
λ′(ω¯)
λ(ω¯) − Ψ
′(ω¯)
Ψ(ω¯)
Ψ′(ω¯)
Ψ(ω¯) +
Γ′(ω¯)
(1−Γ(ω¯))
(35)
where
λ′(ω¯) =
µ [Γ′G′′ − Γ′′G′]
[Γ′ − µG′]2
Ψ′(ω¯) = λ′ [Γ− µG] + λ [Γ′ − µG′]− Γ′
To solve for ω¯, assume that ω is distributed log-normally: ln(ω) ∼ N(−0.5σ2, σ2).
The optimality conditions of proﬁt maximization yield the following demands for households and
entrepreneurial labor:
Wt
Pt
= [Ω (1− α)]MCt Yt
Lht
(36)
W et = (1− Ω) (1− α)MCtYt (37)
where MCt+1 represents the real marginal cost, and W et is entrepreneurial wage.
Following the procedure described by Meier and Muller (2006), it is possible to ﬁnd the thresh-
old value ω¯ which solves the ﬁnancial contract. Under steady state the entrepreneurs' optimality
conditions (5) and (4) can be expressed as
α
M
Y
K
= Rk − (1− δ)
where M is the gross steady state mark-up, equal to the inverse of the marginal cost. Under steady
state the net worth accumulation reads as follows:
N
K
=
θ
γ
V
K
+
(1− Ω) (1− α)
γM
Y
K
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where θ is the survival rate and Ω is the share of households labor. Entrepreneurial equity is
V = [1− µG(ω)]RkQK −R(QK −N)
Substituting for equation (27) the ratio of entrepreneurial equity to capital can be written as
V
K
= (1− Γ(ω))QRk
Combining previous equation yields:
N
K
− θ
γ
(1− Γ(ω))Rk = (1− Ω) (1− α)
γα
[
Rk − (1− δ)
]
Dividing by R = Π/βγ−σc yields
βγ−σc
k (ω) Π
− θ
γ
[1− Γ(ω)] s (ω) = (1− Ω) (1− α)
γα
[
s (ω)− βγ
−σc
Π
(1− δ)
]
(38)
Hence ω, which determines the leverage, the spread and the business failure rate, is a function
of the following parameters: α, β, γ, δ, θ, µ, Π, σc, σ2, Ω.
B.2 Model summary: linearised equations
Note that the deterministic growth rate driven by technological progress is represented by γ, similarly
to Smets and Wouters (2007), and Zkt = Ψ
′(Ut). Lower case variables represent detrended variables,
variables without time subscripts denote steady-state values and the hat denotes variables log-
linearized around their steady state balanced growth path.
cˆt =
h/γ
1 + h/γ
cˆt−1 +
1
1 + h/γ
cˆt+1 − 1− h/γ
σc (1 + h/γ)
(
Rˆnt − Et
[
Πˆt+1
])
−(σ
c − 1) (whLh/C)
σc (1 + h/γ)
(
Et
[
Lˆht+1
]
− Lˆht
)
(39)
wˆt =
βγ1−σc
(1 + βγ1−σc)
Et [wˆt+1] +
1
(1 + βγ1−σc)
wˆt−1 +
βγ1−σc
(1 + βγ1−σc)
Et
[
Πˆt+1
]
−
(
1 + βγ1−σcσwi
)
(1 + βγ1−σc)
Πˆt +
σwi
(1 + βγ1−σc)
Πˆt−1 +
1
(1 + β)σw
(1− βγ1−σcσw)(1− σw)
(µ¯w − 1) εw + 1[
σ`Lˆht +
1
1− h/γ cˆt −
h/γ
1− h/γ cˆt−1 − wˆt
]
+ uwt (40)
mˆt = Aˆt − αZˆkt − (1− α)wˆt + [Ω (1− α)− (1− α)] Lˆht (41)
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Πˆt =
σpi
1 + σpiβγ1−σ
c Πˆt−1 +
βγ1−σc
1 + σpiβγ1−σ
cEt
[
Πˆt+1
]
− 1
1 + σpiβγ1−σ
c
(1− βγ1−σcσp)(1− σp)
σp((µ¯− 1)εp + 1) mˆt + u
p
t (42)
yˆt = Aˆt + α
(
kˆt + Uˆt
)
+ (1− α)Lˆt (43)
Lˆt = ΩLˆ
h
t (44)
Zˆkt =
ζ
1− ζ Uˆt (45)
wˆet = yˆt − mˆt (46)
Rˆkt =
Zk
Rk
Zˆkt +
(1− δ)
Rk
Qˆt − Qˆt−1 (47)
wˆt = Zˆ
k
t − Lˆht + kˆt + Uˆt (48)
Rˆkt+1 − Rˆt = κ(Qˆt + kˆt+1 − nˆt+1) + bˆt (49)
Rˆt = Rˆ
n
t − Πˆt+1 (50)
nˆt+1 =
θ
γ
V
N
vˆt +
W e
γN
wˆet + e
n
t (51)
V
N
v̂t = [1− µG(ω¯)]Rkt
K
N
Rˆkt +
K
N
[
(1− µG(ω¯))Rk −R
] (
Qˆt−1 + kˆt
)
−
−K
N
µRkG′(ω¯)ω¯ ˆ¯ωt +R
(
K
N
− 1
)
Rˆt−1 +Rnˆt (52)
sˆt = [1− s [Γ(ω¯)− µG(ω¯)]]
{
Γ′′(ω¯)
Γ′(ω¯)
− [Γ
′′(ω¯)− µG′′(ω¯)]
Γ′(ω¯)− µG′(ω¯)
}
ω¯ ˆ¯ωt+1 (53)
where s = R
k
R .
cˆet = vˆt (54)
kˆt+1 = δ(ˆit + xˆt) +
(1− δ)
γ
kˆt (55)
iˆt =
1
ξγ2(1 + βγ1−σc)
Qˆt +
1
(1 + βγ1−σc)
iˆt−1 +
βγ1−σc
(1 + βγ1−σc)
Et
[ˆ
it+1
]
+ xˆt (56)
yˆt =
C
Y
cˆt +
Ce
Y
cˆet +
I
Y
iˆt +
G
Y
gt +Z
kK
Y
Uˆt + µG(ω¯)R
kK
Y
(
Rˆkt + Qˆt−1 + kˆt
)
+ µRk
K
Y
G′(ω¯)ω¯ ˆ¯ωt (57)
Rˆnt = ρiRˆ
n
t−1 + (1− ρi)[ρpiΠˆt + ρy (yˆt − yˆ∗t )] + ρ∆y
[
(yˆt − yˆ∗t )−
(
yˆt−1 − yˆ∗t−1
)]
+ eit (58)
where yˆ∗t is the ﬂexible output in an economy without nominal rigidities and markup shocks.
Ât = ρaÂt−1 + εat , ε
a
t ∼ N (0, σa) (59)
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b̂t = ρbb̂t−1 + εbt , ε
b
t ∼ N (0, σb) (60)
Gt = ρgGt−1 + ε
g
t + ρgaε
a
t , ε
g
t ∼ N (0, σg) (61)
eit = ρie
i
t−1 + ε
i
t, ε
i
t ∼ N (0, σi) (62)
ent = ρne
n
t−1 + ε
n
t , ε
n
t ∼ N (0, σn) (63)
x̂t = ρxx̂t−1 + εxt , ε
x
t ∼ N (0, σx) (64)
upt = ρpu
p
t−1 + ε
p
t − µpεpt−1, εpt ∼ N (0, σp) (65)
uwt = ρwu
w
t−1 + ε
w
t − µwεwt−1, εwt ∼ N (0, σw) (66)
C Steady state eﬀects of the deep ﬁnancial parameters
Figure 16 shows the sensitivity of the leverage ratio, the spread, and the elasticity of the external
ﬁnance premium to the calibration of the monitoring costs, µ, the volatility of the idiosyncratic
shock, σ, and the survival rate, θ, respectively  by changing one parameter at a time. This exercise
highlights the eﬀects of the deep ﬁnancial parameters on the ﬁnancial variables targeted under steady
state. The calibration of the other parameters which determines the value of ω¯ is the same as in the
sample 1984-2007, shown in Table 5.17
When monitoring costs are reduced the economy tends to a model without ﬁnancial frictions:
the premium is reduced, entrepreneurs can be more leveraged under steady state, and the elasticity
approaches zero  i.e. a model without asymmetric information. These charts make also it clear
that the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism has nonlinear eﬀects: for the given calibration of the other
parameters, in this experiment ﬁrms are allowed to have a steady state leverage greater than 2 only
for values of the monitoring costs lower than 0.04. Similar nonlinearities can be detected by looking
at the eﬀects on the steady state spread of a change in the monitoring costs.
A reduction in the volatility of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock yields eﬀects analogous to the change in
monitoring costs, as evident from the second row of Figure 16. The spread and the elasticity tend do
decrease, while the optimal leverage in steady state is substantially higher, similarly to the analysis
of Kamber and Thoenissen (2012).
A rise in the survival rate of ﬁrms increases net worth. This implies a reduction in the steady
state leverage and lower levels of the spread. The elasticity follows a similar decreasing pattern, as
shown in last chart of Figure 16.
Hence a reduction in either µ or σ leads to a negative relationship between the spread and the
leverage, while a reduction in the survival rate leads to a fall in both the leverage and the spread.
Fernández and Gulan (2015) suggest that these patters can be explained in terms of demand and
17It is worth noting that, while the steady state common growth rate γ barely aﬀects the ﬁnancial variables, the
steady state inﬂation rate Π has a considerable eﬀects on the steady state spread. In particular, the lower the steady
state inﬂation the higher the spread. This explains why the second sample  featuring lower monitoring costs and
standard deviation of idiosyncratic uncertainty, and higher survival rate  is characterised by a higher steady state
spread.
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Figure 16: Steady state eﬀects on leverage, spread and elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium
with respect to the leverage position of ﬁrms of changing the deep ﬁnancial parameters  monitoring
costs, µ, volatility of the idiosyncratic shock, σ, and the survival rate, θ
supply of loans because the former is aﬀected by a change in the survival rate and the latter by
changes in the volatility and the monitoring costs.
D Data sources and transformations
There are eight observables in the estimation. GDP, GDP deﬂator inﬂation, the federal funds
rate, civilian population (CNP160V) and civilian employment (CE160V) are downloaded from the
ALFRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Private consumption expenditures
and ﬁxed private investment are extracted from the NIPA Table 1.1.5 of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Average weekly hours worked (PRS85006023) and compensation per hour (PRS85006103)
are downloaded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The spread is measured as annualized Moody's
seasoned Baa corporate bond yield spread over the 10-year Treasury note yield at constant maturity
(see Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2013, among others).
Data are transformed as in Smets and Wouters (2007). In particular, GDP, consumption and
investment are transformed in real per-capita terms by dividing their nominal values by the GDP
deﬂator and the civilian population. Real wages are computed by dividing compensation per hour
by the GDP deﬂator. The observable variables of GDP, consumption, investment and wages are
expressed in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Hours worked are multiplied by civilian employment, expressed in per
capita terms and demeaned. The inﬂation rate is computed as a quarter-on-quarter diﬀerence of the
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log of the GDP deﬂator. The federal funds rate and the spread are expressed in quarterly terms and
all the other variables are expressed as 100 times their logarithm. All series are seasonally adjusted
by their sources.
The following set of measurement equations show the link between the observables in the dataset
and the endogenous variables of the DSGE model:
∆Y ot
∆Cot
∆Iot
∆W ot
Lot
piot
Rn,ot
Sot

=

γ
γ
γ
γ
¯`
Π
Rn
s¯

+

yˆt − yˆt−1
cˆt − cˆt−1
iˆt − iˆt−1
wˆt − wˆt−1
Lˆt
Πˆt
Rˆnt
Sˆnt

+

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

, (67)
where variables on the left-hand side are the observables, γ is the common quarterly trend growth
rate of GDP, consumption, investment and wages; ¯` is average hours worked; Π is the average
quarterly inﬂation rate; Rn is the average quarterly nominal interest rate; and s¯ is the average
quarterly spread. A hat over a variable indicates the log-deviation from its own steady state.
In the robustness exercise in Appendix E.3 net worth of the corporate business sector is computed
as in Table 2, i.e. as the diﬀerence between non-ﬁnancial assets and credit market instruments
(liabilities). It is transformed in real per-capita terms and the observable variable is expressed in
ﬁrst diﬀerence.
E Sensitivity exercises for the estimation of the DSGE model
This section illustrates a series of modiﬁcations in the baseline estimation of the DSGE model in order
to analyse the robustness of the main results. Section E.1 shows the sensitivity of the counterfactual
exercises to a longer dataset which includes the Great Recession, while Section E.2 carries out a
similar analysis by looking at the eﬀect of the other structural parameters on the slow recoveries.
Section E.3 explores the robustness of the results when net worth of the corporate business sector
is added as observable in the dataset.
E.1 Including the Great Recession
The most recent ﬁnancial crisis has led to a revived interest in the role of deleveraging and ﬁnancial
factors in aﬀecting the recovery (e.g. Ng and Wright, 2013). The counterfactual exercises presented
in the paper does not include the Great Recession for potential distortionary eﬀects on the estimates
of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. In this section we conduct the counterfactual
exercises for a longer second sample, 1984Q1-2013Q1. The calibration of the sample-speciﬁc pa-
rameters is as follows: the quarterly growth rate of GDP, consumption, investment and wage, γ, is
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Baseline Counterfactuals
Financial parameters Structural and ﬁnancial
Sample 1: 1965-1983 of sample 2 parameters of sample 2
GDP 3.80 3.31 1.16
Investment 6.93 6.06 1.46
Consumption 2.93 2.50 0.95
Financial parameters Structural and ﬁnancial
Sample 2: 1984-2013 of sample 1 parameters of sample 1
GDP 1.24 1.83 1.62
Investment -3.20 -2.18 -4.99
Consumption 1.41 1.62 1.81
Table 11: Average 4-quarter growth rates after trough when sample 2 is 1984-2013
equal to 1.00334, while the steady state inﬂation rate is 1.0059, consistently with the dataset. The
monitoring costs, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock and the survival rate are equal
to 0.103, 0.325 and 0.9808 respectively to target a leverage ratio of 1.83, a spread of 228 basis points
and a business failure rate of about four percent per year. Table 17 shows posterior estimates.
The results of this alternative exercise shown in Tables 11 are in line with those of the shorter
sample. An economy featuring a higher leverage, spread and business failure rate recovers slower 
and viceversa  but the role of ﬁnancial factors per se is limited. When we simulate the outcomes of
the pre-84 shocks with the post-84 parameters in place, the diﬀerence in growth rates after trough
becomes larger, particularly for investment whose growth rate drops to 1.46. However, results should
be interpreted cautiously due to the potential parameter bias due to the zero lower bound.
E.2 The role of other parameters in aﬀecting the speed of recovery
Table 12 shows the eﬀect of the other structural parameters in isolation in accounting for the slow
recoveries. When we simulate the outcomes of the sample 1 shocks with the sample 2 parameters,
monetary policy and price stickiness aﬀect the speed of recovery of both GDP and investment, while
other parameters  such as investment adjustment costs and capital utilisation  play a smaller role.
A similar exercise conducted for sample 2 shows that other structural parameters, such as in-
vestment adjustment costs, price and wage stickiness, barely aﬀect the speed of recovery over the
Great Moderation. Interestingly, if monetary policy would have been conducted as in the 1965-1983
period recoveries would have been even slower.
E.3 Adding net worth of the corporate business sector as observable
This section examines whether results are robust to a diﬀerent estimation procedure. We use net
worth of the corporate business sector as ﬁnancial observable instead of the spread.18
Table 13 shows the outcomes of the pre-83Q4 shocks with the post-83Q4 ﬁnancial parameters
18Table 18 in Appendix G shows the posteriors of the estimated parameters. We tried to estimate the deep ﬁnancial
parameters, but they were not identiﬁed  monitoring costs in particular. Hence, they are calibrated.
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Baseline Counterfactuals
Monet. policy Inv. adj. cost Capital util. Wage stick. Price stick.
of sample 2 of sample 2 of sample 2 of sample 2 of sample 2
Sample 1: 1965-1983
GDP 3.80 2.60 3.78 3.74 3.70 1.95
Investment 6.93 5.79 7.06 6.85 6.72 3.21
Consumption 2.93 1.80 2.83 2.89 2.86 1.70
Sample 2: 1984-2007 Monet. policy Inv. adj. cost Capital util. Wage stick. Price stick.
of sample 1 of sample 1 of sample 1 of sample 1 of sample 1
GDP 1.12 -2.19 0.99 1.19 1.12 0.89
Investment -3.17 -13.00 -3.84 -3.37 -3.21 -3.86
Consumption 1.27 -0.26 1.26 1.34 1.29 1.19
Table 12: Average 4-quarter growth rates after trough
Simulated series 4-quarter growth 4-quarter growth
rate of GDP rate of investment
Sample 1: 1965-1983
Baseline model 3.62 6.62
Counterfactual models
Financial parameters from sample 2 3.59 6.14
Monetary policy from sample 2 2.66 5.40
Inv. adj. cost from sample 2 2.55 3.51
Capital utiliz. from sample 2 3.49 6.59
Wage stickiness from sample 2 3.60 6.23
Price stickiness from sample 2 2.99 4.72
All structural and ﬁnancial
parameters from sample 2 1.56 1.73
Table 13: Average 4-quarter growth rates after trough when the ﬁnancial observable is net worth
in place. Financial parameters of sample 2 aﬀect the growth rates of output and investment, which
decrease. However, the diﬀerence in growth rates between the baseline model and the counterfac-
tual one is not statistically signiﬁcant. When taking into account all the structural and ﬁnancial
parameters, the speed of recovery of GDP and investment is slower similarly to the results shown
in Table 7. These additional counterfactual experiments conﬁrm that the ﬁnancial conditions of the
corporate business sector cannot provide an explanation on why recoveries have become slower since
the 1990s.
Turning to the role of shocks, Table 14 shows variance decomposition analysis of output growth,
investment growth, inﬂation and the nominal interest rate in the estimated models. The wealth shock
accounts for 14% of the variation in investment in the ﬁrst sample, and for 17% of its variation in
the second sample. TFP shock is the dominant source of output growth, while investment-speciﬁc
technology and the risk premium shocks are the main driver of investment. Monetary policy shocks
play a non-negligible role in aﬀecting output ﬂuctuations, while mark-up shocks are the dominant
source of inﬂation variance. The nominal interest rate is mainly driven by the two ﬁnancial shocks,
the risk premium and the wealth shocks. Compared to Table 8, the risk premium shock plays a
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Structural shocks
Wealth Risk Gov. Mon. Invest. TFP Price Wage
premium spending policy speciﬁc mark-up mark-up
Output growth 4.43; 7.47 11.99; 12.54 5.57; 8.96 12.31; 10.52 8.43; 14.43 46.96; 25.48 7.31; 16.39 3.00; 4.20
Investment growth 14.33; 16.89 29.93; 33.50 0.07; 0.02 5.60; 2.07 28.11; 35.63 13.55; 2.91 5.90; 7.77 2.52; 1.22
Inﬂation 37.13; 24.76 17.66; 13.88 2.87; 1.51 1.16; 1.74 14.08; 9.56 11.61; 3.93 10.60; 33.26 4.89; 11.36
Nominal interest rate 35.92; 34.90 23.50; 26.69 2.60; 1.92 5.76; 2.21 18.60; 22.77 8.06; 2.30 2.68; 2.79 2.87; 3.42
Table 14: Variance decomposition. The ﬁrst number refers to the model estimated over the 1965-
1983 sample while the second to the model estimated over the 1984-2007 sample
more prominent role in explaining business cycle ﬂuctuations.
F Allowing for nominal debt-contracts
Bernanke et al. (1999) assume that debt contracts are concluded in real terms. This precludes
the so-called Fisher eﬀect: an unanticipated increase in inﬂation lowers the real debt burden of
entrepreneurs and thus increases their net worth. As shown by Christensen and Dib (2008) and
Christiano et al. (2010), the Fisher-eﬀect generates further ampliﬁcation in the case of monetary
policy shocks. In the case of productivity shocks, instead, an attenuator eﬀect is present. In fact, the
countercyclical change in inﬂation aﬀects the real cost of repaying existing debt, which pushes down
net worth in case of expansionary shocks. Lower net worth increases the external ﬁnance premium,
dampening the rise in the demand for capital.
This section investigates the robustness of the results to the presence of the Fisherian debt-
deﬂation channel.
Similarly to Carrillo and Poilly (2013), let us deﬁne the nominal gross aggregate ex-post return
on capital expenditures, Rknt , as
Et
[
Rknt+1
]
= Et
[
Zkt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
pit+1
]
(68)
In case of nominal debt-contracts the optimal contracting problem can be written as:
max
K,ω¯
(1− Γ(ω¯t+1))Rknt QtKt (69)
s.t. [Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)]Rknt QtKt = Rnt (QtKt −Nt) (70)
Deﬁne sn = R
kn
Rn , k =
QK
N , and λ the Lagrange multiplier. The ﬁrst order conditions are:
ω¯ : Γ′(ω¯t+1)− λ
[
Γ′(ω¯t+1)− µG′(ω¯t+1)
]
= 0 (71)
k : {(1− Γ(ω¯t+1)) + λt [Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)]} snt − λt = 0 (72)
λ : [Γ(ω¯)− µG(ω¯)] snk − (k − 1) = 0 (73)
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Baseline Counterfactuals
Financial parameters Structural and ﬁnancial
Sample 1: 1965-1983 of sample 2 parameters of sample 2
GDP 3.64 3.57 1.99
Investment 6.26 5.76 2.98
Consumption 2.92 2.85 1.69
Financial parameters Structural and ﬁnancial
Sample 2: 1984-2007 of sample 1 parameters of sample 1
GDP 1.13 1.27 -0.56
Investment -3.20 -2.40 -5.35
Consumption 1.29 1.06 -0.76
Table 15: Average 4-quarter growth rates after trough in the model featuring nominal debt-contracts
The presence of nominal debt-contracts aﬀects the following linearised equations:
Rˆknt =
Zk
Rk
Zˆkt +
(1− δ)
Rk
Qˆt − Qˆt−1 + pit+1 (74)
Rˆknt+1 − Rˆnt = κ(Qˆt + kˆt+1 − nˆt+1) + bˆt (75)
V
N
v̂t = [1− µG(ω¯)]Rknt
K
N
Rˆknt +
K
N
[
(1− µG(ω¯))Rkn −Rn
] (
Qˆt−1 + kˆt
)
−
−K
N
µRknG′(ω¯)ω¯ ˆ¯ωt +Rn
(
K
N
− 1
)
Rˆnt−1 +Rnnˆt (76)
Table 15 shows the results of the counterfactual experiments under this alternative speciﬁcation
of the ﬁnancial contract. In the ﬁrst sample the speed of recovery decreases when calibrating the
ﬁnancial parameters to the values of those in sample 2. But the diﬀerence is small, in particular
for output whose 4-quarter growth rate after trough is 3.64 in the baseline speciﬁcation and 3.57 in
the counterfactual experiment. Same results apply to the second sample: an economy featuring a
lower leverage and a lower spread recovers faster. However, the role of ﬁnancial parameters per se is
minor. Overall, the presence of nominal debt-contracts replicates the results of the model featuring
real debt-contracts, shown in Table 7.
Results are robust also as far as variance decomposition analysis is concerned. Table 16 reports
the role of shocks in aﬀecting the business cycle. Similarly to Table 8, the TFP shock is the main
driver of output ﬂuctuations while wealth and investment-speciﬁc technology shocks account for
the majority of movements in investment. Hence our results are robust when allowing for nominal
debt-contracts.
G Posterior estimates
Table 17 reports posterior distributions of the model estimated over the sample 1984Q1-2013Q1.
Table 18 shows the posterior estimates for the models featuring net worth of non-ﬁnancial corporate
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Structural shocks
Wealth Risk Gov. Mon. Invest. TFP Price Wage
premium spending policy speciﬁc mark-up mark-up
Output growth 8.25; 7.88 0.31; 0.64 8.89; 15.79 10.25; 12.11 12.66; 20.81 54.52; 37.27 3.36; 5.15 1.75; 0.35
Investment growth 33.88; 27.75 1.51; 2.76 0.84; 0.08 3.04; 3.75 53.62; 62.73 5.58; 1.71 1.01; 0.52 0.52; 0.70
Inﬂation 56.43; 19.16 0.97; 0.41 8.43; 1.16 3.26; 1.92 7.41; 1.70 8.01; 1.87 9.17; 59.70 6.33; 14.07
Nominal interest rate 61.74; 52.34 1.09; 2.66 8.80; 5.40 6.66; 4.61 9.96; 20.04 4.87; 3.86 2.29; 2.53 4.59; 8.56
Table 16: Variance decomposition in the model featuring nominal debt-contracts. The ﬁrst number
refers to the model estimated over the 1965-1983 sample while the second to the model estimated
over the 1984-2007 sample
sector as observable variable. Table 19 reports the posterior estimates for the two samples, 1965-
1983 and 1984-2007 in the model featuring nominal debt-contracts. Finally, Table 20 shows posterior
distributions of the model estimated over the whole sample, 1965-2007. For each speciﬁcation the
posterior is obtained using the random walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm with two chains of
250,000 draws each.
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Prior distribution Posterior mean
Parameters Distr Mode St.Dev. 1984-2013
Structural
ξ, inv. adj. costs Normal 4 1.5 3.12 [1.28,4.85]
σ`, elasticity of work Normal 2 0.25 2.26 [1.90,2.63]
h, habit parameter Beta 0.7 0.1 0.31 [0.24,0.39]
σp, Calvo prices Beta 0.5 0.1 0.85 [0.78,0.95]
σw, Calvo wages Beta 0.5 0.1 0.89 [0.85,0.92]
σpi, price indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.32 [0.11,0.51]
σwi, wage indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.36 [0.14,0.56]
ζ, elasticity of capital util Beta 0.5 0.15 0.90 [0.84,0.96]
ρpi, Taylor rule Normal 1.5 0.25 1.51 [1.02,1.79]
ρy, Taylor rule Beta 0.125 0.05 0.04 [0.01,0.07]
ρ∆y , Taylor rule  changes in y Normal 0.2 0.05 0.28 [0.23,0.33]
ρi, Taylor rule smoothing Beta 0.75 0.1 0.76 [0.71,0.80]
¯`, steady state hours worked Normal 0 2 -0.17 [-1.89,1.48]
s¯, steady state spread Normal 0.50 0.1 0.47 [0.32,0.64]
Shocks
ρa, per. of tech shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 [0.98,1.00]
ρb, per. of risk premium shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.95 [0.93,0.98]
ρg, per. of gov shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.93 [0.90,0.95]
ρx, per. of investment shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.71 [0.63,0.79]
ρi, per. of monetary shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.32 [0.23,0.41]
ρp, per. of price mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.87 [0.78,0.96]
ρw, per. of wage mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.58 [0.30,0.90]
ρn, per. of wealth shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 [0.98,1.00]
µp, MA  price mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.94 [0.89,1.00]
µw, MA  wage mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.88 [0.82,0.95]
ρga, per. of gov to tech shock Beta 0.5 0.25 0.46 [0.34,0.57]
σa, std of tech shock IG 0.1 2 0.50 [0.45,0.55]
σb, std of risk premium shock IG 0.1 2 0.09 [0.08,0.10]
σg, std of gov shock IG 0.1 2 0.39 [0.34,0.43]
σx, std of investment shock IG 0.1 2 0.49 [0.37,0.60]
σi, std of monetary shock IG 0.1 2 0.14 [0.12,0.16]
σp, std of price mark-up shock IG 0.1 2 0.17 [0.14,0.21]
σw, std of wage mark-up shock IG 0.1 2 0.45 [0.39,0.50]
σn, std of wealth shock IG 0.1 2 0.20 [0.16,0.24]
Table 17: Prior and posterior distributions in the sample 1984Q1-2013Q1
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Prior distribution Posterior mean Posterior mean
Parameters Distr Mode St.Dev. 1965-1983 1984-2007
Structural
ξ, inv. adj. costs Normal 4 1.5 1.43 [0.52,2.40] 5.20 [3.24,7.15]
σ`, elasticity of work Normal 2 0.25 2.15 [1.78,2.54] 2.18 [1.80,2.55]
h, habit parameter Beta 0.7 0.1 0.43 [0.35,0.52] 0.39 [0.31,0.47]
σp, Calvo prices Beta 0.5 0.1 0.58 [0.50,0.64] 0.72 [0.63,0.82]
σw, Calvo wages Beta 0.5 0.1 0.91 [0.88,0.94] 0.92 [0.89,0.94]
σpi, price indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.26 [0.11,0.40] 0.27 [0.10,0.43]
σwi, wage indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.46 [0.29,0.62] 0.33 [0.14,0.51]
ζ, elasticity of capital util Beta 0.5 0.15 0.59 [0.41,0.77] 0.78 [0.66,0.91]
ρpi, Taylor rule Normal 1.5 0.25 1.45 [1.32,1.57] 1.82 [1.62,2.03]
ρy, Taylor rule Normal 0.125 0.05 0.02 [0.00,0.03] 0.03 [0.01,0.04]
ρ∆y , Taylor rule  changes in y Normal 0.2 0.05 0.22 [0.16,0.28] 0.18 [0.14,0.23]
ρi, Taylor rule smoothing Beta 0.75 0.1 0.41 [0.35,0.46] 0.77 [0.72,0.81]
¯`, steady state hours worked Normal 0 2 -0.50 [-3.35,2.54] 1.16 [-1.65,4.01]
γn, growth rate of net worth Normal 0.33 0.1 0.40 [0.25,0.56] 0.34 [0.20,0.48]
Shocks
ρa, per. of tech shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 [0.96,0.99] 0.96 [0.94,0.98]
ρb, per. of risk premium shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.90 [0.85,0.95] 0.94 [0.92,0.96]
ρg, per. of gov shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 [0.96,0.99] 0.98 [0.96,0.99]
ρx, per. of investment shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.89 [0.81,0.98] 0.90 [0.85,0.96]
ρi, per. of monetary shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.15 [0.05,0.24] 0.22 [0.12,0.33]
ρp, per. of price mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.75 [0.61,0.90] 0.87 [0.76,0.99]
ρw, per. of wage mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.54 [0.33,0.77] 0.50 [0.29,0.71]
ρn, per. of wealth shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 [0.98,1.00] 0.99 [0.98,1.00]
µp, MA  price mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.49 [0.25,0.71] 0.60 [0.39,0.81]
µw, MA  wage mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.44 [0.19,0.73] 0.40 [0.13,0.65]
ρga, per. of gov to tech shock Beta 0.5 0.25 0.59 [0.48,0.71] 0.49 [0.36,0.62]
σa, std of tech shock IG 0.1 2 0.79 [0.68,0.90] 0.46 [0.40,0.52]
σb, std of risk premium shock IG 0.1 2 0.25 [0.18,0.32] 0.26 [0.21,0.31]
σg, std of gov shock IG 0.1 2 0.48 [0.42,0.55] 0.36 [0.31,0.40]
σx, std of investment shock IG 0.1 2 0.61 [0.41,0.82] 0.27 [0.21,0.33]
σi, std of monetary shock IG 0.1 2 0.48 [0.40,0.55] 0.14 [0.12,0.16]
σp, std of price mark-up shock IG 0.1 2 0.19 [0.14,0.23] 0.11 [0.08,0.14]
σw, std of wage mark-up shock IG 0.1 2 0.20 [0.15,0.24] 0.28 [0.23,0.34]
σm, std of wealth shock IG 0.1 2 0.24 [0.18,0.30] 0.23 [0.17,0.28]
Table 18: Prior and posterior distributions in the two samples of the model featuring net worth of
non-ﬁnancial corporate sector as observable variable
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Prior distribution Posterior mean Posterior mean
Parameters Distr Mode St.Dev. 1965-1983 1984-2007
Structural
ξ, inv. adj. costs Normal 4 1.5 4.42 [2.71;6.02] 4.42 [2.37;6.30]
σ`, elasticity of work Normal 2 0.25 2.11 [1.72;2.50] 2.39 [2.03;2.75]
h, habit parameter Beta 0.7 0.1 0.44 [0.36;0.53] 0.30 [0.22;0.38]
σp, Calvo prices Beta 0.5 0.1 0.56 [0.50;0.60] 0.86 [0.79;0.93]
σw, Calvo wages Beta 0.5 0.1 0.87 [0.84;0.91] 0.85 [0.80;0.91]
σpi, price indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.25 [0.10;0.40] 0.41 [0.14;0.68]
σwi, wage indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.61 [0.45;0.77] 0.33 [0.13;0.53]
ζ, elasticity of capital util Beta 0.5 0.15 0.74 [0.60;0.89] 0.78 [0.68;0.90]
ρpi, Taylor rule Normal 1.5 0.25 1.37 [1.22;1.52] 1.51 [1.21;1.79]
ρy, Taylor rule Normal 0.125 0.05 0.03 [0.01;0.05] 0.11 [0.06;0.16]
ρ∆y , Taylor rule  changes in y Normal 0.2 0.05 0.23 [0.17;0.30] 0.28 [0.23;0.33]
ρi, Taylor rule smoothing Beta 0.75 0.1 0.49 [0.41;0.56] 0.80 [0.76;0.84]
¯`, steady state hours worked Normal 0 2 -1.62 [-3.39;0.21] 0.92 [-0.20;2.03]
s¯, steady state spread Normal 0.50 0.1 0.53 [0.37;0.69] 0.48 [0.32;0.64]
Shocks
ρa, per. of tech shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 [0.97;1.00] 0.97 [0.95;1.00]
ρb, per. of risk premium shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.86 [0.80;0.92] 0.92 [0.88;0.96]
ρg, per. of gov shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.95 [0.93;0.97] 0.94 [0.92;0.96]
ρx, per. of investment shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.57 [0.42;0.72] 0.59 [0.50;0.68]
ρi, per. of monetary shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.18 [0.07;0.30] 0.19 [0.09;0.29]
ρp, per. of price mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.68 [0.50;0.86] 0.67 [0.40;0.89]
ρw, per. of wage mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.48 [0.23;0.73] 0.67 [0.44;0.92]
ρn, per. of wealth shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 [0.94;1.00] 0.99 [0.98;1.00]
µp, MA  price mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.45 [0.21;0.69] 0.88 [0.79;0.98]
µw, MA  wage mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.41 [0.17;0.67] 0.92 [0.87;0.98]
ρga, per. of gov to tech shock Beta 0.5 0.25 0.54 [0.42;0.66] 0.46 [0.32;0.59]
σa, std of tech shock IG 0.1 2 0.82 [0.71;0.93] 0.46 [0.40;0.51]
σb, std of risk premium shock IG 0.1 2 0.10 [0.09;0.12] 0.06 [0.05;0.07]
σg, std of gov shock IG 0.1 2 0.51 [0.44;0.59] 0.37 [0.33;0.42]
σx, std of investment shock IG 0.1 2 0.71 [0.53;0.90] 0.54 [0.43;0.64]
σi, std of monetary shock IG 0.1 2 0.43 [0.36;0.49] 0.13 [0.11;0.15]
σp, std of price mark-up shock IG 0.1 2 0.19 [0.15;0.24] 0.18 [0.15;0.21]
σw, std of wage mark-up shock IG 0.1 2 0.20 [0.16;0.24] 0.37 [0.32;0.44]
σm, std of wealth shock IG 0.1 2 0.22 [0.14;0.29] 0.17 [0.13;0.21]
Table 19: Prior and posterior distributions in the two samples of the model featuring nominal
debt-contracts
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Prior distribution Posterior mean
Parameters Distr Mode St.Dev. 1965-2007
Structural
ξ, inv. adj. costs Normal 4 1.5 4.43 [2.88;5.99]
σ`, elasticity of work Normal 2 0.25 2.44 [2.09;2.79]
h, habit parameter Beta 0.7 0.1 0.34 [0.28;0.41]
σp, Calvo prices Beta 0.5 0.1 0.58 [0.51;0.64]
σw, Calvo wages Beta 0.5 0.1 0.89 [0.86;0.92]
σpi, price indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.24 [0.10;0.38]
σwi, wage indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.42 [0.18;0.66]
ζ, elasticity of capital util Beta 0.5 0.15 0.70 [0.55;0.84]
ρpi, Taylor rule Normal 1.5 0.25 1.34 [1.26;1.43]
ρy, Taylor rule Beta 0.125 0.05 0.03 [0.01;0.04]
ρ∆y , Taylor rule  changes in y Normal 0.2 0.05 0.33 [0.28;0.39]
ρi, Taylor rule smoothing Beta 0.75 0.1 0.53 [0.47;0.59]
¯`, steady state hours worked Normal 0 2 0.54 [-1.23;2.28]
s¯, steady state spread Normal 0.50 0.1 0.50 [0.34;0.67]
Shocks
ρa, per. of tech shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.98 [0.97;0.99]
ρb, per. of risk premium shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.93 [0.90;0.97]
ρg, per. of gov shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 [0.96;0.98]
ρx, per. of investment shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.57 [0.45;0.68]
ρi, per. of monetary shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.13 [0.05;0.22]
ρp, per. of price mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 [0.95;0.99]
ρw, per. of wage mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.89 [0.81;0.96]
ρn, per. of wealth shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 [0.99;1.00]
µp, MA  price mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.73 [0.62;0.85]
µw, MA  wage mark-up shock Beta 0.5 0.2 0.96 [0.92;0.99]
ρga, per. of gov to tech shock Beta 0.5 0.25 0.53 [0.44;0.62]
σa, std of tech shock IG 0.1 2 0.64 [0.58;0.69]
σb, std of risk premium shock IG 0.1 2 0.08 [0.07;0.09]
σg, std of gov shock IG 0.1 2 0.44 [0.40;0.48]
σx, std of investment shock IG 0.1 2 0.56 [0.46;0.67]
σi, std of monetary shock IG 0.1 2 0.33 [0.30;0.37]
σp, std of price mark-up shock IG 0.1 2 0.16 [0.14;0.19]
σw, std of wage mark-up shock IG 0.1 2 0.32 [0.28;0.35]
σn, std of wealth shock IG 0.1 2 0.24 [0.20;0.27]
Table 20: Prior and posterior distributions in the sample 1965Q1-2007Q4
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